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NOTE
Due-on-Sale Clauses: Separating Social
Interests from Individual Interests
I. INTRODUCTION
For the past fifteen years mortgage markets in the United
States have been characterized by a generally rising trend in mort-
gage interest rates and by increasingly precipitous swings in those
rates.1 Until recently, the almost exclusive vehicle for financing
purchases of real property was the fixed rate mortgage with a term
of twenty to thirty years. During the period between World War II
and the Vietnam War, the institutions that made these loans
garnered funds from sources that offered stable availability and
cost. As interest rates rose during the 1970's these institutions were
no longer able to secure funds at rates that did not exceed the av-
erage rates of their mortgage portfolios, and many began to experi-
ence losses.2 In order to avoid or reduce those losses, institutional
lenders have increasingly sought to enforce due-on-sale
clauses-provisions in mortgage contracts that enable lenders to
accelerate loans when the underlying property is sold.
Appellate courts in at least twenty-nine states have ruled on
the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses.3 Although a majority of
1. See U.S. LEAGUE OF SAVINGS ASS'NS, '81 SAVINGS & LOAN SOURCEBOOK, table 25, at
27 (1981) [hereinafter cited as '81 SOURCEBOOK]; FED. Hom LOAN BANK BOARD, FED. HOME
LOAN BANK BOARD J.: ANNUAL REPORT 1980, tables S.5.1-.3, at 110-11; see also U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, ser. 477, at 1003 (1975) (interest
rates on Moody's Aaa corporate bonds, 1919-1970).
2. Roessner & Nagle, Asset-Liability Management for Savings and Loans, FED. HomE
BANK BOARD J., July 1981, at 25.
Volatile interest rates have caused a dramatic shift in the deposit mix at the nation's S
& Ls. As recently as May 1978, 97 percent of deposits at S & Ls were at fixed rates of 8
percent and below .... At that point, only 3 percent of deposits were in the form of
market sensitive jumbo certificates. By April 1981, 6-month money market certificates
and jumbos comprised 47 percent of all deposits, with another 12 percent in 30-month
MMCs [money market certificates]. The passbook deposit share had fallen about half,
from 37 percent to 21 percent of all deposits.
Id. at 26.
3. A recent compilation of these decisions appears in Dunn & Nowinski, Enforcement
of Due-on-Sale Clauses: An Update, 16 REAL PRoF. PROS. & TR. J. 291, 315-17 (1981).
Since the appearance of the Dunn and Nowinski article, further decisions have been re-
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courts have opted for "automatic" enforceability,4 a substantial
minority have concluded that unless a lender can demonstrate that
the sale of the property will jeopardize the security of the lender's
collateral, the clause will not be enforced.5 Borrowers challenging
the validity of due-on-sale clauses have often attempted to charac-
terize the clauses as restraints on alienation. Courts have re-
sponded in a variety of ways: some courts have concluded that the
clauses are illegal restraints, others have found that they are legal
restraints, and still others have held that the clauses are not re-
straints at all. Some jurisdictions have labelled due-on-sale clauses
unfair and, under equitable principles, denied automatic enforce-
ment. Other jurisdictions have considered automatic enforcement
and have found no unfairness.' Recent commentary has suggested
that in certain cases the clauses are appropriately viewed as con-
tracts of adhesion,8 an analysis that would permit a court to deny
enforcement when the mortgagor is a consumer and the lender is
an institution, but to uphold the clause when both lender and bor-
rower are commercial enterprises or when the lender is an individ-
ual extending a purchase money mortgage. The list of appellate
decisions will undoubtedly grow; as long as interest rates remain at
current levels, the substantial financial benefit of avoiding the pay-
ment before maturity of a loan carrying a relatively low rate of
ported. See Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981) (applying
Virginia law); Wilhite v. Callihan, 121 Cal. App. 3d 661, 175 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1981); Dawn
Inv. Co. v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 439, 172 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1981); Damen Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 431 N.E.2d 34 (Ill. App. 1982); Dunham
v. Ware Sav. Bank, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1607, 423 N.E.2d 998; Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Mid-
west Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1981); Mills v. Nashua Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 433 A.2d 1312 (N.H. 1981); State ex rel. Bingaman v. Valley Say. & Loan Ass'n,
636 P.2d 279 (N.M. 1981); Ceravolo v. Buckner, 444 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. 1981); First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Jenkins, 109 Misc. 2d 715, 441 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Sup. Ct. 1981); North-
western Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Ternes, 315 N.W.2d 296 (N.D. 1982); First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Kelly, 312 N.W.2d 476 (S.D. 1981); Crestview, Ltd. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 621
S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., 286 S.E.2d 215 (Va. 1982);
United Virginia Bank v. Best, 286 S.E.2d 221 (Va. 1982); see also Great N. Say. Co. v.
Ingarra, 66 Ohio St.2d 503, 423 N.E.2d 128 (1981) (reserving issue of automatic enforceabil-
ity of due-on-sale clauses).
4. As used in this Note, "automatic enforcement" means enforcement without the ne-
cessity of inquiry into the lender's motives. See Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485, 487 (Ala.
1979).
5. See infra notes 37-53 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 11-40 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
8. See Maxwell, The Due-on-Sale Clause: Restraints on Alienation and Adhesion
Theory in California, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 197 (1980); Note, Due-on-Sale Clauses: A Sug-
gested Approach For Dealing With Non-Institutional Lenders, 8 WAYNE L. R.v. 57 (1980).
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interest assures that the mortagor's incentive to challenge enforce-
ment of a due-on-sale clause will remain high.
The array of disparate arguments and conclusions that cur-
rently characterizes the law of due-on-sale clauses must necessarily
be confusing for courts faced with the issue of enforceability. This
Note suggests that courts have failed to articulate properly the re-
lation of the due-on-sale clause to the legal doctrines under which
it has been challenged. In particular, courts that have considered
the clauses to be restraints on alienation have concentrated on the
impact of enforcement or nonenforcement on the borrower, and
have ignored almost completely the social interest in the free
transferability of land, which has been the traditional rationale for
the rule against restraints. Likewise, courts that have considered
due-on-sale clauses under equitable principles frequently have
failed to articulate whether the inequity arises from an attempt by
one party to seek more than was contained in the contract, or be-
cause the due-on-sale clause is too harsh a term to be forced upon
a weaker party. By failing to isolate the social policy goals that
those doctrines seek to advance, courts have produced opinions in
which different lines of argument are confused, with the result that
these opinions are left vulnerable to the criticism that they are the
instruments of result oriented "judicial legislation." Additionally,
this confusion of argument has resulted in a tendency to approach
the due-on-sale clause issue as a search for a single rule, and thus
has limited a jurisdiction's flexibility to reach a contrary result in a
case whose facts may warrant it. By seeking a clear definition of
the policy goals that are implicated in the due-on-sale clause con-
troversy, this Note suggests an appropriate analytical framework
that a court may use to approach a due-on-sale clause issue in
cases of first impression. Additionally, the Note considers the re-
lated issue of the due-on-encumbrance clause in terms of the sug-
gested analysis and concludes that because of the different consid-
erations which apply to the due-on-encumbrance clause, a judicial
decision that due-on-sale clauses warrant automatic enforcement
does not compel the same result with respect to due-on-encum-
brance clauses.9
II. DtmE-ON-S~AE CLAUSES IN THE COURTS
Judicial responses to the due-on-sale clause have employed di-
9. See infra part V.
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verse rationales to justify or prohibit enforcement.10 This diversity
not only is the result of the courts' different views on the nature of
the problem and their desires to reach particular results, but also
is related to variety in the form of the acceleration device used and
differences in the factual settings of the cases. In many of the opin-
ions more than one mode of analysis is considered, and in some
cases multiple justifications for the court's conclusion are stated
without a clear indication of which one is determinative. The anal-
yses fall into two main lines of argument. The first considers
whether the due-on-sale clause is a restraint on alienation and con-
sequently subject to invalidation under the rules relating to such
restraints and the public policy against them. The second consid-
ers whether the enforcement of the clause would be equitable, with
specific consideration given to the purpose for which the clause
was included in the mortgage.
A. Due-on-Sale Clauses as Restraints on Alienation
In a majority of the recent due-on-sale clause cases the party
seeking to prevent enforcement of the clause has alleged that it is
unenforceable as an illegal restraint on alienation."' The courts
that have addressed this allegation may be grouped according to
the criteria that they have accepted as determinative of the result.
Their reasoning may be abstracted as follows:
(1) The due-on-sale clause is not a restraint on alienation be-
cause the borrower has made no express promise not to convey
the estate. The clause is enforceable.
(2) The due-on-sale clause is not a restraint on alienation be-
cause its enforcement produces no practical restraining effect.
The clause is enforceable.
10. See generally Report of Subcommittee on "Due-on" Clauses of the American Bar
Association Committee on Real Estate Financing, Enforcement of Due-on-Transfer
Clauses, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 891 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Enforcement].
11. See, e.g., Dunham v. Ware Sav. Bank, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh.. 1607, 423 N.E.2d 998;
Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1981). For
summaries of the rule against restraints and its relation to the due-on-sale clause, see G.
OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 5.21, at 297-99 (1979);
Volkmer, The Application of the Restraints on Alienation Doctrine to Real Property Se-
curity Interests, 58 IOWA L. REv. 747 (1973); and infra note 67 and notes 105-13 and accom-
panying text. On the subject of restraints in general, see 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§
26.1-.132 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); W. FRATCHER, PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 1-240
(1954); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 404-423 (1944); 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 1111-1172 (2d ed. 1956); Bernhard, The Minority Doctrine Concern-
ing Direct Restraints on Alienation, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1173 (1959).
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(3) The due-on-sale clause is a'restraint on alienation, and such
restraints will be enforced when reasonabl . The lender may rea-
sonably enforce the clause to gain an increased rate of interest.
The clause is enforceable.
(4) The due-on-sale clause is a restraint on alienation, and such
restraints will be enforced when reasonable. Enforcement is un-
reasonable unless the lender can show that his security will be
impaired upon transfer. The clause is not automatically
enforceable.
1. Clause Enforceable-No Express Promise Not to Convey
The due-on-sale clauses challenged in the reported decisions
have been of two distinct types. The first type, which this Note
designates a "consent-to-transfer clause," is a. contractual covenant
wherein the mortgagor promises not to convey without the consent
of the lender.12 This clause is normally coupled with a further pro-
vision that upon breach of a covenant the mortgagee may declare
the note immediately payable, with the effect that by refusing con-
sent the lender may force acceleration of thi underlying obligation
upon transfer of the property by the mortgagor. The second type,
which this Note designates an "acceleration clause" requires no
promise that the mortgagor will not convey without consent, but
merely stipulates that the note becomes due upon conveyance. 8 In
12. See, e.g., Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1
(1975). The disputed clause in Baker was of the. consent-to-transfer type and contained the
following language:
"A. THE MORTGAGOR COVENANTS DURING THE TERM OF THIS
MORTGAGE
(8) Not to suffer or permit without the written permission or consent of the mort-
gagee first had and obtained:
(d) A sale, assignment, or transfer of any right, title or interest in and to said
property or any portion thereof."
Id. at 121, 333 N.E.2d at 2.
13. See, e.g., Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan As'n, 308 N.W.2d 471
(Minn. 1981). Holiday Acres considered the validity of an acceleration clause that contained
the following language:
In the event that the mortgagors convey the title (legal, equitable, or both) to all or any
portion of said premises or in the event that such title becomes vested in a person
other than the mortgagors in any manner whatsoever except under the power of emi-
nent domain, that in any such case the entire unpaid principal of the note secured
hereby with all accrued interest thereon shall, at the option of the mortgagee at any




spite of the apparent similarity in effect of these two types of de-
vices,14 in many opinions this distinction appears to be material.
For example, one court considering an acceleration clause stated,
"[T]he right of the mortgagee to sell his equity is not involved.
The acceleration provision recognizes this right. All it does, is to
provide that when the mortgagor does this, the mortgagee has the
right to demand payment of his debt in full."'1 5 Under this analysis,
if the clause is not of the consent-to-transfer type, the inquiry into
the nature of the clause as a restraint on alienation has ended,
since any restraining effect is not the sort of which the law takes
cognizance.' One court has suggested that the obverse might be
true, that consent-to-transfer clauses are automatically unenforce-
able, 17 but no jurisdiction giving automatic enforcement to acceler-
ation clauses has stated such a rule.
2. Clause Enforceable-No Practical Restraint
The opinions of some courts have acknowledged that if en-
forcement of an acceleration clause were to have the practical ef-
fect of restraining alienation, the clause might not be enforceable.
After inquiry into the nature of the effect of such clauses on the
transferability of property, however, these courts have concluded
that no practical restraining effect exists. According to this view,
the only disadvantage to the mortgagor resulting from enforcement
of the clause is the inability to profit from the "sale" of a sub-
market rate mortgage-something for which he had not bargained
in the first place.
This argument appeared in the dissenting opinion of Justice
14. See infra text accompanying notes 61-64.
15. Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tenn. 1973); accord First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Jenkins, 109 Misc. 2d 715, -, 441 N.Y.S.2d 373, 379 (Sup. Ct. 1981); cf. Crockett v.
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 624-25, 224 S.E.2d 580, 584 (1976) (acceleration
clause did not cause the same type of "direct restraint" as had been struck down in previous
restraint cases).
16. See Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 615 S.W.2d 333, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981) (acceleration clause creates no "direct" restraint); cf. Mills v, Nashua Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 433 A.2d 1312, 1314 (N.H. 1981) (acceleration clause not "per se unreasonable"
restraint on alienation because it did not "in itself, result in the forfeiture of the owner's
title and did not preclude the mortgagor from conveying the property"); Mutual Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99, 108 n.1, 205 N.W.2d 762, 767-68 n.1
(1973) (restraints on alienation prohibited in Wisconsin constitution are "those employed
under feudal property law to enforce the obligations of the tenant to his landlord").
17. See Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 925-26, 925 n.33 (4th
Cir. 1981) (stating that lenders must "dot the 'i's and cross the 't's"); see also Dunham v.
Ware Say. Bank, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1607, - n.3, 423 N.E.2d 998, 999 n.3 (court's ruling
on acceleration clause not to apply to consent-to-transfer clauses).
[Vol. 35:357
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Clark in Wellenkamp v. Bank of America,18 a case in which the
California Supreme Court refused to permit automatic enforce-
ment of due-on-sale clauses in mortgage loans made by institu-
tional lenders. Justice Clark's reasoning has since been adopted by
Nebraska in Occidental Savings & Loan Association v. Venco
Partnership.9 In Occidental Savings the court first noted that the
acceleration clause under consideration did not fall within the defi-
nition of restraints on alienation provided by section 404 of the
Restatement of Property.20 The court then stated,
It is true that the possibility of acceleration may impede the ability of an
owner to sell his property as he wishes; nonetheless, not every impediment to
sale is a restraint on alienation, let alone contrary to public policy. It is a fact
that zoing restrictions, building restrictions, or public improvements may im-
pede the sale and substantially affect the ability of the owner to realize a
maximum price.... We are somewhat at a loss to understand how or why so
18. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 957, 582 P.2d 970, 979, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 388 (1978) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
A seller possessing property and a buyer lacking sufficient funds can seldom do busi-
ness if financing is unavailable. . . . If they can do business . . . it follows that the
buyer must pay the going interest rate and the seller, as an incentive to the buyer, may
be required to reduce the selling price. If a loan exists on the property with a due-on
clause, no increased restraint on selling results if the lender cannot accept the pro-
posed buyer, the situation then being the same as in the case of the unavailability of
funds to the proposed buyer. If the lender will permit assumption but only at an in-
creased interest rate, again no increased restraint results because without the existing
loan the buyer would be required to pay the higher interest rate and the seller may be
required to compromise his selling price. There is thus no increased restraint on aliena-
tion beyond that inherent in the economic conditions postulated by the majority....
[If the due-on-sale clause is not enforced], [b]ecause [the] seller has a marketable,
sought-after asset in the form of a low-interest transferable loan-something he never
bargained for-he can ask for and expect to get additional considerations from his
buyer .... The loan has thus become not a restraint on alienation but a factor making
salable what before could not be sold.
Id. at 956-57, 582 P.2d at 978-79, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 387-88 (emphasis in original).
19. 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980).
20. Id. at 472, 293 N.W. at 845. The RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, § 404,
defines restraints on alienation as follows:
(1) A restraint on alienation, as that phrase is used in this Restatement, is an
attempt by an otherwise effective conveyance or contract to cause a later conveyance
(a) to be void; or
(b) to impose contractual liability on the one who makes the later conveyance
when such liability results from a breach of an agreement not to convey; or
(c) to terminate or subject to termination all or a part of the property interest
conveyed.
(2) If a restraint on alienation is of the type described in Subsection (1), Clause
(a), it is a disabling restraint.
(3) If a restraint on alienation is of the type described in Subsection (1), Clause
(b), it is a promissory restraint.
(4) If a restraint on alienation is of the type described in Subsection (1), Clause
(c), it is a forfeiture restraint.
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many courts have been willing to describe a due-on-sale clause as a restraint
on alienation and are unwilling to do so.21
The court concluded that the facts of the case under consideration
demonstrated that an acceleration clause is not a practical re-
straint on alienation since title had been transferred with little
difficulty.
22
Two recent cases apparently adopted this same reasoning, but
avoided an explicit holding that an acceleration clause is not a
practical restraint on alienation by stating that if the clause consti-
tutes any practical restraint at all, then it is a reasonable, and
therefore enforceable, one. In Williams v. First Federal Savings &
Loan Association s the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying
Virginia law, indicated its skepticism that an acceleration clause
created any practical restraining effect.
The due-on-sale clause, standing by itself, can hardly be a restraint on aliena-
tion. In the first place, its effect is to remove a lien or encumbrance-namely
the security deed of trust-and thereby render the parcel more aliena-
ble-not less. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the homeowner
whose property is subject to a due-on-sale clause is as free to sell, and, in
selling, to realize as much as a homeowner holding the same property free
and clear of any encumbrance.
24
The court then compared a mortgage loan containing a due-on-sale
clause to a mortgage loan payable on demand from the outset and
stated that because the latter could certainly not be termed a re-
21. 206 Neb. at 472-73, 293 N.W.2d at 845.
22. Id. at 475, 293 N.W.2d at 846-47. Apparently in accord with Occidental Savings is
Crestview, Ltd. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 621 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981). In Crestview the
court found that the enforcement of a due-on-sale clause would not "result in any evil the
rule against such restraints was designed to prevent" and that it was not a restraint on
alienation. Id. at 826. Although no finding of reasonableness is necessary under such an
analysis, the court went on to approve the clause as reasonable. Id. at 826-27. The court,
however, admitted that such a clause could constitute an indirect restraint that "consists in
the inhibiting effect such a clause has with respect to prospective purchasers and the owner,
who may be compelled either to forego a ... sale o;r arrange for immediate payment of a
large sum of money." Id. at 823.
23. 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981).
24. Id. at 923 n.29; see also id. at 923-24 ("Viewed in isolation. [a due-on-sale clause]
cannot be said to create a restraint on alienation, or if it does, it is one validated by the
Virginia legislature.") (footnote omitted). The court cited VA. CODE § 6.1-330.34 (1979),
which sets forth a form of notice that must be prominently displayed on deeds of trust
containing due-on-sale clauses. 651 F.2d at 923. In a footnote the court quoted extensively
from Occidential Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843
(1980), and from the dissent of Justice Clark in Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943,
148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 582 P.2d 970 (1978). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals termed the
Wellenkamp majority's "attempted rebuttal" of Justice Clark's dissent a "combination of
non sequitur and unsupported assumptions." 651 F.2d at 923 n.29; see also Lipps v. First
Am. Serv.- Corp., 286 S.E.2d 215, 219-20 (Va. 1982) (adopting reasoning of Williams).
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straint on alienation, the former could not be a restraint since its
terms were by far the more favorable.2 5 The Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court in Dunham v. Ware Savings Bank 2  followed
the reasoning in Williams and concluded that if any practical re-
straining effect resulted from an acceleration clause it was a rea-
sonable one.17 The court noted that there was "substantial author-
ity" that due-on-sale clauses were not restraints on alienation, 8
citing passages from Occidental Savings and Williams.
3. Due-on-Sale Clause as Reasonable Restraint
Some jurisdictions admit the restraining effect of the due-on-
sale clause, but find the restraint to be reasonable. They find the
due-on-sale clause to be a restraint either because it is in the form
of a consent-to-transfer clause 29 or because an acceleration clause
may produce an "indirect" or "practical" restraining effect on the
ability to alienate.30 Courts applying this rationale have taken the
position that reasonable restraints on alienation are permissible,
and that unreasonable restraints are not,3 1 and have concluded
that the lender's interest in maintaining his loan portfolio at a
profitable average rate renders the restraint reasonable. 2 Specific
25. 651 F.2d at 924 n.29.
26. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1607, 423 N.E.2d 998.
27. Id. at -, 423 N.E.2d at 1000.
28. Id. at -, 423 N.E.2d at 1000.
29. See, e.g., Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 296, 509 P.2d
1240, 1241 (1973); Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill. 2d 119, 121, 333 N.E.2d 1,
2 (1975).
30. See, e.g., Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. &"Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 625, 224 S.E.2d
580, 584 (1976).
[TIhe practical effect of the due-on-sale clause when it is considered in isolation is that
the owner is encouraged not to alienate his property if it would be more advantageous
to enjoy a loan which has become favorable because of changed interest rates in the
market. This is what may be termed a hindrance or an indirect restraint on alienation.
Id. (emphasis in original). This group of cases necessarily includes Williams v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981), and Dunham v. Ware Sav. Bank, 1981
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1607, 423 N.E.2d 998, opinions that have sidestepped the issue of the exis-
tence of a restraint by stating that if any restraint exists, it is a reasonable one. See supra
text accompanying notes 23-28.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 105-10.
32. See, e.g., Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 301, 509 P.2d
1240, 1244-45 (1973); Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 627, 224
S.E.2d 580, 587 (1976). But cf. Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 IlM. 2d 119, 125-
28, 333 N.E.2d 1, 4-6 (1975) (consent-to-transfer clause held to be reasonable restraint; in-
terest rate increase of 1% per annum held reasonable, but viewed as liquidated damages for
breach of covenant); Provident Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Realty Centre, Ltd., 428 N.E.2d
170, 174 (I1. App. 1981) (Scott, P.J., dissenting) (suggesting that Baker did not address
issue whether a due-on-sale clause might be enforced solely for purpose of increasing rate of
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justifications for the conclusion that the clauses are reasonable in-
clude that the clauses are a "legitimate and reasonable business
practice";"3 that they protect the lending institution's depositors;
3 4
that they represent an equitable adjustment of the rights of the
borrower and lender; 5 and that they enable lenders to make long-
term fixed rate loans.3 6
4. Due-on-Sale Clause as Unreasonable Restraint
A final group of cases follows the previous cases in their rea-
soning that due-on-sale clauses are restraints on alienation and
that their nature as a restraint invokes a test of reasonableness.
7
These courts, however, have concluded that the due-on-sale clause
is an unreasonble restraint.3 8 Implicit in this finding is a rejection
of the justifications that have been offered for the clauses. This
group of courts, however, has not declared the clauses wholly unen-
forceable, but has instead applied a per se rule of unreasonableness
when the party is not motivated by a "legitimate interest." Specifi-
cally, this view has held that the enforcement of the clause for the
purpose of increasing loan yields is not among the legitimate inter-
ests of the lender, 9 whose proper interest is in protecting the se-
lender's mortgage portfolio).
33. Century Fed. Say. & Loan v. Van Glahn, 144 N.J. Super. 48, 54, 364 A.2d 558, 561
(Ch. Div. 1976).
34. See, e.g., Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 302, 509 P.2d
1240, 1244-45 (1973); Dunham v. Ware Sav. Bank, 81 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1607, -, 423 N.E.2d
998, 1003.
35. See Dunham v. Ware Sav. Bank, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1607, _, 423 N.E.2d 998,
1002.
36. See Malouff v. Midland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 303, 509 P.2d 1240,
1245 (1973); Crestview, Ltd. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 621 S.W.2d 816, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981).
37. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 1 Cal. 3d 943, 949-51, 582 P.2d 970, 973,
148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 382 (1978); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App.
163, 165-67, 250 N.W.2d 804, 805-06 (1977); Bellingham First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Garrison, 87 Wash. 2d 437, 440-41, 553 P.2d 1090, 1091 (1976); see also Patton v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473, 477, 578 P.2d 152, 1656-59 (1978) (due-on-sale clause
effects "very harsh restraint"; lender must show impairment of security to justify
enforcement).
38. See Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 953, 582 P.2d 970, 975-76, 148
Cal. Rptr. 379, 384-86 (1978); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App.
163, 174, 250 N.W.2d 804, 808-09 (1977); State ex rel. Bingaman v. Valley Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 636 P.2d 279 (N.M. 1981); Bellingham First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87
Wash. 2d 437, 441, 553 P.2d 1090, 1092 (1976).
39. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 954-55, 582 P.2d 970, 976,
148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 385 (1978); Bellingham First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87
Wash. 2d 437, 440-41, 553 P.2d 1090, 1092 (1976).
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curity of its loan. Additionally, this view has maintained that forc-
ing borrowers to shoulder the risk of a lender's inability to
accurately project interest rates is unfair.4 °
B. Due-on-Sale Clauses Under Equitable Principles
In another major group of cases in which due-on-sale clauses
have been successfully attacked, the clauses have been subjected to
a test of reasonableness after the court's invocation of equitable
powers in a foreclosure proceeding.41 The restraints on alienation
arguments set forth above either do not arise or are incorporated
in the court's rejection of foreclosure as inequitable. 42  These
courts, like the courts that follow the Wellenkamp majority's rea-
soning, permit enforcement when the lender demonstrates that his
security may be impaired, but refuse enforcement as inequitable if
the lender's purpose is to increase the loan's interest rate or to col-
lect a transfer fee.43
Frequently, what the courts regard as the true source of the
inequity cannot be determined from the opinions.4 These courts
simply state that enforcement is unreasonable because the only
purpose of the clause is to protect the lender's security, not to pro-
40. See Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 952-53, 582 P.2d 970, 976, 148
Cal. Rptr. 379, 385 (1978).
41. See, e.g., Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 853, 481 S.W.2d
725, 728 (1972) (enforcement solely on basis of written clause "cannot be countenanced in a
court of equity"); see also Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 186 P.2d 190
(1971); Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Continental Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Okla. 1977). See generally Note, Mort-
gages-A Catalogue and Critique on the Role of Equity in the Enforcement of Modern-
Day "Due-on-Sale" Clauses, 26 ARK. L. REV. 485 (1973).
42. See, e.g., Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 81, 486 P.2d 190, 193
(1971) (clause's effect as restraint on alienation held insufficient to justify absolute avoid-
ance, but sufficient to impose reasonableness requirement; equity should not order foreclo-
sure absent allegations that lender's security is jeopardized).
43. See, e.g., Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 855, 481 S.W.2d
725, 729 (1972) ("arbitrary" disapproval of lender might force a sale "at great sacrifice");
Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583, 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (foreclosure unjust
"where no harm has resulted to mortgagee from [the] conveyance"). Other courts have re-
fused enforcement on equitable grounds when the conveyance was to a corporation of which
the mortgagor was the sole principal, see Nichols v. Evans, 92 Misc. 2d 938, 401 N.Y.S.2d
426 (Dutchess County Ct. 1978), or to a principal, when the corporation was the original
mortgagor. See Fidelity Land Dev. Corp. v. Rieder & Sons Bldg. & Dev. Co., 151 N.J. Super.
502, 377 A.2d 691 (App. Div. 1977). Such cases may also be explained in terms of the princi-
ples of contract interpretation, since it was probably not intended by the parties that the
conveyance would trigger the due-on-sale clause. See id. at 510-11, 377 A.2d at 695. But see
Damen Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 431 N.E.2d 34, 36-37 (Ill.
App. 1982).
44. See, e.g., Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
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vide a lever for increased profits. Whether the courts might allow
the parties to agree contractually upon some other purpose, how-
ever, is unclear. For example, in the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
decision in Continental Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Fetter 5 the court, after stating that "[a]cceleration clauses are
bargained-for elements of mortgages and notes to protect the
mortgagee, 46 made the flat assertion that the "underlying ratio-
nale for an acceleration clause is to... afford the lender the right
to be assured of the safety of his security. 4 7 The court, averring to
the rule that agreements restricting the sale of property must be
reasonable, noted that the mortgage did not contain reference to
the transfer fee that the lender had attempted to impose and con-
cluded that the foreclosure would not be granted "because neither
the note nor the mortgage contained such a provision; it was not a
bargained-for element of the note and mortgage; . . .and there
was no jeopardizing of the mortgagee's security. '48 This case may
be read as a simple instance of an interpretation of contract contra
proferentem,4 9 but the a priori assertion that the purpose of the
due-on-sale clause is to protect the lender's security blurs the
court's rationale.5
45. 564 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1977).
46. Id. at 1017.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1019; see also First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156, 159
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (court noted statement in mortgage that "intent" of mortgage was
to secure payment of note).
49. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981).
Interpretation Against the Draftsman
In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term
thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who sup-
plies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.
Id.; see also A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONMACTS § 559 (1960).
50. Cf. Silver v. Rochester Say. Bank, 73 A.D.2d 81,424 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1980). In Silver
the court considered a mortgage agreement stipulating that the mortgagee's consent to as-
sumption would not be withheld unreasonably. From the inclusion of the reasonableness
requirement, and the circumstances of the case, the court concluded that the normal infer-
ence to be drawn from the clause was that the the lender's purpose in including it was
concern about the security of the collateral. Id. at 86, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 948; cf. First S. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Britton, 345 So. 2d 300 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977), overruled, Tierce v. APS
Co., 382 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1979).
Since the purpose of any mortgage is to obtain security for the loan and thereafter
minimize the risks in repayment, it may be said that the purpose of all clauses in the
mortgage is to protect the security of the mortgagee.
The terms of the clause give no indication that an interest of the mortgagee other
than the protection of its security is [cause for acceleration] . ..
We do not say that the mortgagee may not specifically contract for the option to
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Other courts have resisted the idea that inequity results when
a lender is allowed to enforce a due-on-sale clause solely for his
financial gain.51 The reasons these courts have given are much the
same as the reasons given by those courts which find that the
clauses are reasonable restraints on alienation-that the seller of
the property is only seeking the unbargained-for right to sell his
loan and that lenders have a legitimate need to keep their portfo-
lios responsive to the current market rates for mortgages.52 Neither
do these courts see any ambiguity in the typical acceleration clause
that might permit a restricted interpretation of the clause; the as-
sertion is frequently made that a court will not rewrite the parties'
contract.5
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSE AS A RESTRAINT
ON ALIENATION
Some of the differences in analysis and result in the cases
summarized in part II can be attributed to variations in the phras-
accelerate in the event of sale unless the purchaser agrees to ... increased interest.
345 So. 2d at 303. But cf. Crestview, Ltd. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 621 S.W.2d 816, 822-23 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1981) (enforcement of clause equitable in spite of provision in deed of trust that
lender would not unreasonably withhold consent to sale).
51. See Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1979); Stith v. Hudson City Sav. Inst.,
63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Ceravolo v. Buckner, 444 N.Y.S.2d 861
(Sup. Ct. 1981); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
52. See, e.g., Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485, 487 (Ala. 1979); Stith v. Hudson City
Say. Inst., 63 Misc. 2d 863, 867-68, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804, 808 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Ceravolo v. Buck-
ner, 444 N.Y.S.2d 861, 863 (Sup. Ct. 1981) ("contractual rights of the mortgagee should be
no less entitled to the recognition and protection of the court than those of the mortgagor");
Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529, 531-32 (Tenn. 1973). But cf. First Commercial Title, Inc.
v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976). In Holmes the court placed the burden of
establishing grounds for nonenforcement on the borrower, but added that "[a] lender has
the right to be assured in his own mind of the safety of his security without the burden of
showing at each transfer that his security is being impaired." Id. at 366, 550 P.2d at 1272.
Some jurisdictions note that equity will refuse enforcement if the borrower can prove
that foreclosure would be unjust in the circumstance. In Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Wisconsin Wire Works, 71 Wis. 2d 531, 539, 239 N.W.2d 20, 24 (1976), the court agreed with
the lender that the adjustment of a mortgage portfolio to current rates would justify en-
forcement, but implied that equity might refuse enforcement if the lender demanded a rate
above the current average. See also Mills v. Nashua Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 433 A.2d 1312,
1315-16 (N.H. 1981) (suggesting that equity might refuse to enforce due-on-sale clause in
specific situations, giving as examples transfers to a spouse who becomes co-owner, transfers
to a spouse upon dissolution of marriage, and transfer to an inter vivos trust of which the
mortgagor is beneficiary).
53. See, e.g., Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 630, 224 S.E.2d
580, 587 (1976); Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 615 S.W.2d 333, 339 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1981).
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ing or operation of the due-on-sale clause under consideration, 4 or
to the nature of the proceeding as equitable or legal.55 Even after
these factors are taken into account, however, much remains unex-
plained. The general lack of clarity in the opinions that have re-
fused automatic enforcement of the clauses leaves them vulnerable
to the criticism that the courts have been prejudiced in favor of
the consumer and have permitted an unwarranted dip into the
lender's supposedly deep pocket. 8 Additionally, at least one opin-
ion implies that under some circumstances a due-on-sale clause
may be enforceable, but provides no clear indication why those cir-
cumstances demand a different result.5 7 The cause of this confu-
sion has been a failure both to segregate the interests of the indi-
vidual parties to the mortgage contract and the interests of society
at large, and to articulate the nature of those interests. The thrust
of the rule against restraints on alienation is the protection of soci-
ety's interest in the unfettered transferability of real property.58
Courts whose findings of unreasonableness are based on the own-
er's difficulty in attempting to sell property subject to an automati-
cally enforceable due-on-sale clause 9 have focused on the wrong
interests. The counterargument that any disadvantage to the indi-
vidual property owner is assumed to have been compensated for in
the contract process is an effective one. Although defects in the
contract process may also provide good grounds for nonenforce-
ment, such defects should be remedied by application of contract
law principles, not by application of the rule against restraints.
In light of the confused reasoning of cases that have invoked
the rule against restraints to protect the individual, courts, not sur-
prisingly, have expressed doubt whether due-on-sale clauses con-
54. For example, the result may turn on whether the clause appears as a consent-to-
transfer clause or an acceleration clause, see supra text accompanying notes 12-17, or the
language of the clause may suggest that the lender's sole purpose for including the clause
was the protection of his security, see, e.g., Clark v. Lachemneier, 237 So. 2d 583, 584 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (clause granting mortgagee "the right and privilege of accepting or
rejecting, or passing on credit, etc. of such successor in ownership").
55. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
56. See, e.g., Enforcement, supra note 19, at 935-36.
57. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 952 n.9, 582 P.2d 970, 976
n.9, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 385 n.9 (1978) (holding limited to "institutional lenders").
58. See 6 AmrmcAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, § 26.3; RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
ERTY, supra note 11, §§ 404-423 introductory note.
59. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 949-51, 582 P.2d 970, 974-
75, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 383-84 (1978); Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471, 484 (Minn. 1981) ("The need of the borrower-occupier for quick and
easy transfer of personal residence is greater than that of the investment borrower.").
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stitute any restraint on alienation, 0 particularly when a clause
does not contain a promise not to convey without consent. A com-
parison, however, of due-on-sale clauses with other contractual de-
vices that have traditionally been regarded by courts and authori-
ties as restraints on alienation exposes the nature of the restraint.
Specifically, this comparison reveals that a legally cognizable re-
straint on alienation exists whenever a device imposes upon a
property owner a loss or penalty that is triggered by sale. More-
over, an analysis of traditional restraints makes plain that an abso-
lute prohibition on transfer or a consent requirement is not neces-
sary to invoke the rule against restraints.
A. Effect of Form-Consent-to-Transfer or Acceleration Clause
Some courts state or suggest that the result in a given case will
depend on whether the clause is of the "consent-to-transfer" or the
"acceleration" variety. 1 Such a conclusion is difficult to support.
Indeed, under almost any conceivable circumstance the practical
operation of the two clauses is identical-each clause confers upon
the lender the right to accelerate the loan upon conveyance of the
property. The only potential for differing effect between the two
clauses is that under a consent-to-transfer clause a lender could
attempt to obtain specific performance or an injunction against the
transfer. 2 Under such circumstances the restraining effect is clear,
but the normal and proper course for the court is to refuse specific
performance and merely allow a sale of the land to operate as a
breach of a covenant or an "event of default," which in turn brings
the acceleration provision into play.68
Identical treatment of the two forms of due-on-sale clauses is
both equitable and logical." If a court finds enforcement of the
60. See supra text accompanying notes 18-28.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 12-17.
62. Of course, if an owner were to convey property in violation of a consent-to-transfer
clause, a lender could theoretically recover for damages suffered as a result of the breach.
Damages, however, will normally be limited to the amount of the debt plus interest, see 22
AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 64 (1965), which is the same amount that would be due under the
typical acceleration clause.
63. This treatment has been suggested as the proper judicial response to the "negative
pledge," or covenant not to transfer or encumber property. See G. GILMoRE, SECURITY IN-
TERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 38.4, at 1017 (1965); G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHr-
MAN, supra note 11, § 3.33, at 113 (1979).
64. Although its logic was flawed, the court in In re Bonder, 285 S.E.2d 615, 616 (N.C.
App. 1982), opted for identical treatment. The court approved the automatic enforcement of
a consent-to-transfer clause and stated that the North Carolina Supreme Court had con-
strued consent-to-transfer clauses as equivalent to acceleration clauses in Crockett v. First
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lender's purpose appropriate, surely that purpose should not be
frustrated by setting a trap for the inept draftsman. Similarly, a
court which believes that the form of the clause somehow elimi-
nates the necessity to inquire into its practical effects as a restraint
on alienation has elevated considerations of form over the appro-
priate inquiry-whether the enforcement of the clause runs
counter to the social interests that the rule against restraints at-
tempts to protect.
B. Practical Restraining Effect
Perhaps the most hotly disputed aspect of the due-on-sale
clause controversy is whether a practical restraining effect results
from enforcement of a due-on-sale clause that should subject it to
scrutiny as a restraint on alienation. 5 Most discussions treating
this issue begin by listing various classes and categories into which
restraints have been divided in an attempt to find a place for the
due-on-sale device, and, apparently, in search of an appropriate
rule of law.66 This approach risks entanglement in the semantic
thicket6e that has grown around the subject of restraints and, by
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976). The clause under scrutiny in
Crockett, however, was an acceleration clause. See id. at 621-22, 224 S.E.2d at 582.
65. See, e.g., Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 923 n.29 (4th Cir.
1981); Dunham v. Ware Sav. Bank, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1607, -, 423 N.E.2d 998, 1000-01
(1981); Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471, 482-84
(Minn. 1981)..
66. These courts are frequently concerned with whether the clause is a "direct" or an
"indirect" restraint, since some authority maintains that the rule against restraints does not
apply to "indirect" restraints. See, e.g., Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73
Mich. App. 163, 165-68, 250 N.W.2d 804, 805-06 (1977); Occidental Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 473-74, 293 N.W.2d 843, 846 (1980). See generally G.
OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 11, § 5.21, at 297-99; Volkmer, supra note
11, at 773-75.
67. The following categories of restraints on alienation, which have been identified or
suggested by a variety of authorities, all apply to provisions contained both in deeds and in
separate contracts:
Disabling/ForfeiturePromissory. A disabling restraint is one that, if specifically en-
forced, would cause a future conveyance to be void. A forfeiture restraint is one that, if
specifically enforced, would terminate or subject to termination all or part of the prop-
erty interest conveyed. A promissory restraint would impose contractual liability on
one who makes a later conveyance in breach of an agreement not to convey. See RE-
STATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, § 404 (reproduced supra note 20).
Restraint on Practical Alienability/Restraint on Legal Power of Alienation. Commen-
tators have defined the former as any provision "which, if valid, would tend to impair
the marketability of property," and the latter as a provision that would render convey-
ance legally impossible. See 3 L. Simrs & A. SMrrH, supra note 11, § 1111, at 4.
DirectlIndirect. Shines and Smith define a direct restraint as a provision "which, by its
express terms, or by implication of fact, purports to prohibit or penalize ... aliena-
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placing the emphasis on categorization, usually neglects the central
issue-the actual consequences of enforcement. By setting aside
the categorization process and exploring the actual effects of the
due-on-sale clause in a hypothetical situation, this Note demon-
strates that the due-on-sale clause is almost identical in its opera-
tion." Id. § 1112, at 5. An indirect restraint "arises when an attempt is made to accom-
plish some purpose other than . . . restraint . . . , but with the incidental result that
the instrument, if valid, would restrain practical alienability." Id. This distinction is in
the purpose of the restraint. "Indirect restraints" normally arise on the creation of
future interests and of trusts, according to Simes and Smith. Id. One commentator
stated that indirect restraints "do not directly nullify or penalize a transfer of property
but. . have the indirect effect of making alienation impossible, difficult, or improba-
ble." W. FRATCHER, supra note 11, at 7. Fratcher considers virtually any division into
separate present interests, or of a present interest into present and future interests, an
indirect restraint. See id. at 7-9. Some writers limit "direct restraint" to a restraint
that would restrict the legal power of alienability. See Volkmer, supra note 11, at 748;
see also J.C. GRAY, RESTRmNTs ON ALIENATION § 8 (1895) ("speaking strictly ... a
future interest is not a restraint . . . unless the contingency upon which the future
interest depends is itself the alienation of the estate").
Restraints in Substance but Not in Form. The American Law of Property does not
discuss promissory or indirect restraints, but includes in this "restraints in substance"
group conditions restricting the use of land, preemptive provisions, restrictions on oc-
cupancy, and other conditions restricting the fee but not stipulating any legal disability
or forfeiture. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, §§ 26.63-.80.
Reasonable/Unreasonable Restraints. The majority doctrine of restraints on alienation
has traditionally held that, as a general rule, restraints are per se invalid without re-
gard to reasonable purpose or effect in the particular case, but that certain classes of
restraints are enforceable where social interests justify enforcement. See Coast Bank v.
Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 316, 392 P.2d 265, 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505, 508 (1964);
Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 299-301, 509 P.2d 1240,
1243 (1973). Under the "minority doctrine" of restraints on alienation, any restraint
may be enforced if it can be shown that, in the particular case, enforcement would be
reasonable. See generally Bernhard, supra note 11; infra text accompanying notes 29-
36.
The most serious source of confusion appears to be the idea that unless a restraint
purports to restrict the legal power of alienation, it is "indirect" and, therefore, not tradi-
tionally subject to the rule against restraints. See Volkmer, supra note 11, at 748-49. Simes
and Smith do not so severely limit the application of the rule against restraints. See 3 L.
SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 11, § 1112, at 5 ("while the classification of restraints as
restraints on the power of alienation and restraints only on the fact of alienability corre-
sponds in many instances to the classification as direct and indirect restraints, the two clas-
sifications are not coextensive"). Neither does the Restatement of Property thus limit its
coverage. See RESTATEMzNT OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, § 413 comments f, g (justifying
rules against "quarter-sales" and fixed price preemptions because of their effect as produc-
ing a "hesitancy to sell" or "hindrance to alienation"); id. § 404 comment g (declaring that a
promise to pay a part of sale proceeds to grantor or another "is a promise not to convey
without so doing and hence is a promissory restraint"; infra text accompanying notes 92-93.
The latest addition to the list of terms used to categorize restraints was contributed by the
court in Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981). The Fourth
Circuit in Williams distinguished the nature of a consent-to-transfer clause from the nature
of an acceleration clause, terming the former "a flat restraint on alienation." Id. at 925.
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tion and effect to several other devices that have long been re-
garded as subject to the rules against restraints on alienation.
In a recent ruling on the enforceability of a due-on-sale
clause,"" a court estimated that a home which would sell unmort-
gaged for $100,000 if the market rate of interest for 30-year, fixed
rate mortgages were 15% per annum, would sell for $115,000 if it
carried an assumable $50,000 fixed rate mortgage at 10% with a
remaining term of 27 years.6 9 Some further effects associated with
enforcement of due-on-sale clauses following a rise in the general
level of mortgage rates may be understood by using as a basis the
hypothetical as it appeared in the case,70 and, in addition, assum-
ing that in 1978 Smith and Jones, both Assistant Engineers at the
U.S. Motors truck plant in state A, each purchased a residence
identical to the one described above for $70,000. While Smith exe-
cuted a $50,000 fixed rate mortgage containing a due-on-sale
clause, Jones, who in 1978 believed that interest rates had reached
a peak, chose to secure a variable rate mortgage. In 1982, when
home prices and mortgage rates have risen to the higher figures
stipulated above, a position as Senior Engineer becomes available
in U.S. Motors' plant in state B. Although Smith is the firm's first
choice for the job he refuses it. Smith realizes that since his mort-
gage is not assumable, if he is to sell his house in state A for
$100,000 and pay off his sub-market rate mortgage, his current
level of mortgage payments will support only a $35,000 mortgage
at the prevailing 15% rate. Therefore, at his current level of pay-
ments he will only be able to replace his $100,000 house in state A
with an $85,000 house in state B. Because Smith is "locked-in" to
his current home by having chosen a fixed rate mortgage, he now
lives in a house that he might not be able to afford if purchased
68. Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 915 n.8 (4th Cir. 1981).
69. Id. The monthly payment required to amortize a $50,000 mortgage at 10% per
annum over a 27 year period is $447.05. See D. THORNDIKE, THORNDIKE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BANKING AND FINANCIAL TABLES, table 5, at 5-76 (rev. ed. 1980). If the interest rate is 15%
per annum, the same payments will amortize a mortgage of $35,124.98. See id. table 5, at 5-
156. The hypothetical assumes that the buyer is indifferent about which mortgage he ob-
tains as long as the monthly payment remains the same. In practice, the premium for such a
home with an assumable mortgage will probably be less, since the assumption of the first
mortgage may force the buyer to raise the rest of his purchase money by means less desira-
ble than a market rate first mortgage-for example, through the advancement of additional
cash, or the execution of a second mortgage, perhaps at a rate higher than the rate for first
mortgages.
70. The court used the hypothetical to illustrate the advantage that accrues to a mort-
gagor when enforcement of a due-on-sale clause is denied. Williams v. First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 915 n.8 (4th Cir. 1981).
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under present conditions, but he may reap the benefit of his bar-
gain only if he remains there. When Jones is offered the job, he
takes it. Because of his mortgage's variable rate, he is making a
higher payment than Smith, but will be able to secure approxi-
mately the same variable rate financing for a new home.71 Because
of a poor decision in 1978, Jones, unlike Smith, has no value inher-
ent in his home financing arrangements that will be extinguished
(or at least lost to him) upon sale of his home.
The courts which have held that due-on-sale clauses are in no
way restraints on alienation would argue that the positions of both
Smith and Jones would be unchanged following the sales of their
homes.72 This argument, however, fails to consider that before the
sale Smith, as long as he remains in his home, is in a far better
position than Jones, because of the lower payments on his fixed
rate mortgage. More significantly, the argument ignores that be-
cause of Smith's disinclination to sacrifice that superior position,
the wrong man has gotten the job. For this reason a welfare loss,
external to the parties to the mortgage contract, is associated with
the arrangement.
7 8
71. Of course, a variable rate mortgage may be structured in such a way that it im-
poses some disadvantage upon a mortgagor who prepays the mortgage on his existing resi-
dence and executes a new variable rate mortgage when he moves. This disadvantage, how-
ever, is generally far less than that faced by the mortgagor of a fixed rate mortgage. See
Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471, 482 n.15 (Minn.
1981); Volkmer, supra note 11, at 801.
72. Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 923 n.29 (4th Cir. 1981).
The due-on-sale clause, standing by itself, can hardly be a restraint on alienation. In
the first place, its effect is to remove a lien or encumbrance-namely the security deed
of trust-and thereby render the parcel more alienable-not less. Moreover, and per-
haps more importantly, the homeowner whose property is subject to a due-on-sale
clause is as free to sell, and, in selling, to realize as much as a homeowner holding the
same property free and clear of any encumbrance.
Id. See also Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 956-57, 582 P.2d 970, 978-79, 148
Cal. Rptr. 379, 387-88 (1978) (Clark, J., dissenting); Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco
Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 477-78, 293 N.W.2d 843, 847-48 (1980).
73. The welfare loss is the amount of lost production at the plant in state B caused by
the assignment of the less effective employee to the Senior Engineer position. This loss ex-
ists without regard to the economic impact of enforcement upon the parties to the mortgage
contract. That society may be injured when parties contract among themselves is a tradi-
tional concern of the common law. Closely analogous to the instant situation is the rule
against unreasonable postemployment restraints. The test of reasonableness in evaluating
these restraints has been described as "a problem of balancing the social detriment of re-
stricting the promisor's activities and the social advantages of protecting the promisee in the
legitimate interest given him by the contract and of enabling the covenantor advantageously
to dispose of his business, practice, or property." Annot., 46 A.L.R. 2d 119, § 26, at 201
(1956). The "social detriments" of this arrangement include the potential that the restraint
may "deprive the community of the benefit of the promisor's services and the benefit which
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Courts opting for automatic enforcement might argue that if a
court were to refuse to enforce the due-on-sale clause in Smith's
mortgage and thereby allow him to sell his home for $115,000 in-
stead of $100,000, he would be the beneficiary of a windfall. 4 This
conclusion is undoubtedly valid, assuming that the clause was fully
understood and bargained for and that Smith had no reason to ex-
pect to receive an extra $15,000 for his home. Moreover, the
$15,000 has been taken from the pocket of the mortgagee, who
might have immediately made another $50,000 loan at the market
rate. Thus, evaluating the relative interests of only the mortgagor
and the mortgagee, a court could reasonably be compelled out of a
sense of fairness to enforce the clause. A benefit to society, how-
ever, results if the court rules Smith's 10% mortgage assumable,
since such a decision would allow Smith to realize his $15,000
windfall and to make a larger downpayment on a home in state B.
The extra cash available would offset the disadvantage of the
smaller mortgage that he can afford at a 15% annual rate and
would enable him to purchase a home that is the approximate
equivalent of the one he left in state A.75 Smith would thus be
under no disincentive to move, and "the right man would get the
job"-that is, resources would be allocated more appropriately.
C. Effect of Traditional Restraints Compared
The "lock-in" or penalty that results from the enforcement of
due-on-sale clauses is essentially the same effect as that produced
by several other devices that courts and authorities have tradition-
his competition might offer to the general public." Id. One commentator has suggested that
the balancing of burdens of the individual parties to a postemployment contract will adjust
society's interest as well, since "the social cost of preventing an employee from going to a
job at which he would be more productive is theoretically equal, given an efficient market,
with the economic loss to the individual." Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73
HAxtv. L. REv. 625, 686-87 (1960). Clearly, however, the social cost equals zero only when the
employee's economic loss equals zero, that is, when the postemployment restriction is
eliminated.
74. See, e.g., Great N. Say. Co. v. Ingarra, 66 Ohio St. 2d 503, 513, 423 N.E.2d 128, 134
(1981) (Rutherford, J., dissenting).
75. If an exactly equivalent home in state B costs $100,000 and carries no assumable
mortgage, Smith may purchase it by offering the $65,000 in cash received as proceeds from
the sale of his state A residence, and borrow the $35,000 balance under a first mortgage. His
monthly mortgage payment will remain essentially unchanged. (Smith will be more likely to
secure a $35,000 mortgage at 15% for 30 years than the hypothetical $35,124.98 mortgage at
15% for 27 years, discussed supra note 69, which would have produced a monthly payment
equivalent to that on the mortgage on his state A home. His payment will be reduced from




ally viewed as subject to the rules against restraints on alienation."
Three such devices are the penalty on alienation, the fractional
sale, and the fixed price preemption.77
1. Penalty on Alienation
The most direct and obvious attempts to prevent alienation of
property have taken the form of "disabling" or "forfeiture" re-
straints, which provide for either a legal inability to convey or a
loss of the fee by reversion or gift over upon attempted convey-
ance.78 Obviously, however, an enforceable contractual covenant
stipulating the forfeiture of some other property upon alienation of
the fee may also present an effective deterrent to alienation. The
simplest provision of this sort would be the forfeiture of a sum of
money or a bond following alienation of specified property. Al-
though this device appears to have been used rarely, controversy
over its effectiveness is of ancient origin. Lord Coke fired the open-
ing salvo when, after stating that on a feoffment in fee a condition
not to alienate is void, he asserted, "But if the feoffee be bound in
a bond, that the feoffee or his heires shall not alien, this is good,
for he may notwithstanding alien if he will forfeit his bond that he
himself hath made. '17  Notwithstanding Coke's conclusion, when
such bonds were given against the disentailment of fees by com-
mon recovery or fine, the English common-law courts disagreed on
whether the bond was enforceable.80 In the single American case to
76. An understanding of the penalty imposed by the due-on-sale clause makes clear
that an essential difference in effect exists between this sort of restraint and an "indirect
restraint." See supra note 67. The imposition of an "indirect restraint" in the form of a
future interest, trust, use restriction, or similar device may render property less valuable,
but subsequent sale does not of itself alter that value, and the owner is not inhibited from
selling. When sale itself triggers a loss of value, however, a reluctance to sell results that
may be less severe than in the case of the forfeiture restraint (i.e., if the amount of the
penalty is less than the value of the property) or, conceivably, greater than in the case of a
forfeiture restraint (i.e., if the amount of the penalty exceeds the value of the property).
77. One commentator has previously drawn this analogy with respect to the percent-
age sale and the fixed price preemption. See Volkmer, supra note 11, at 799-800.
78. See cases cited supra note 34.
79. 2 E. COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INsTrruTEs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 334, at
206b (1st Am. ed. Philadelphia 1812) (1st ed. London 1628).
80. Compare Freeman v. Freeman, 2 Vern, 233, 23 Eng. Rep. 751 (1691) (bond given
upon promise not to bar fee tail held valid) with Jervis v. Bruton, 2 Vern. 251, 23 Eng. Rep.
762 (1691) (citing rule that recognizance conditioned upon tenant's promise not to bar fee
tail is void as illegal perpetuity). The rule of enforcement of such a bond was disapproved
by Gray. See J.C. GRAY, supra note 67, § 77, at 72; cf. Collins v. Plummer, 2 Vern. 635, 23
Eng. Rep. 1015 (1708) (relief denied in suit for specific performance of covenant not to bar
fee tail; assertion by court that action for damages would lie).
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decide the enforceability of such a provision, the court adopted the
approach of Lord Coke, but its result has been criticized by the
authorities.8 1
Of similar and perhaps indistinguishable practical effect would
be a provision in a deed or contract that if tract A is alienated, the
alienor will forfeit tract B by reversion, right of reentry, or gift
over. Such a provision is not a restraint on the legal power of alien-
ation and, perhaps for this reason, Coke took the same position
with respect to its validity as he did to the validity of a bond.82 In
what is again a single American case presenting a close parallel
with this situation, a court held such a forfeiture provision enforce-
able. 3 Commentators, however, have suggested that the character
of the land, a burial plot, influenced the result, since otherwise ille-
gal restraints have frequently been found permissible when a bur-
ial plot is the subject of the restraint."
The greater the value of the penalty, the stronger will be the
restraint-the owner's incentive to retain, rather than sell, his
land. Courts and other authorities have perceived that severe pen-
alties may result from the enforcement of contracts containing per-
centage sale provisions and fixed price preemptions because the
seller forfeits value upon sale of his property.8 5 This loss of value is
the source of the restraining effect of the due-on-sale clause: the
mortgagor, upon sale of his real property, forfeits a valuable con-
81. The court's conclusion in Bliven v. Borden, 56 R.I. 283, 185 A. 239 (1936), is criti-
cized in 6 AmERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, § 26.71. The issue almost arose in
Robinson v. Thurston, 23 Hawaii 777 (1917), rev'd, 248 F. 420 (9th Cir. 1918). In that case a
mother and daughter had entered into an agreement that the daughter would forgive a debt
on condition that the mother not sell certain land and that she not incur debt in an amount
over $1,000. Although the claim that the mother had violated the agreement by conveying
her land was abandoned, id. at 782, the Territorial Supreme Court held that the debt would
not be reinstated since the provision against incurrence of debt was an illegal restraint of
trade. Id. at 786-88. The Ninth Circuit reversed the case on this point. 248 F. at 422-24.
82. 2 E. COKE, supra note 79, § 360, at 223a. Lord Coke stated,
If A. be seised of Black Acre in fee, and B. infeoffeth him of White Acre upon
condition that A. shall not alien Black Acre, the condition is good, for the condition is
annexed to other land, and ousteth not the feoffee of his power to alien the land
whereof the feoffment is made, and so no repugnancy to the state passed by the feoff-
ment; and so it is of gifts, or sales of chattels reals or personals.
Id.
83. Camp v. Cleary, 76 Va. 140 (1882).
84. See 6 AMaRicAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, § 26.71. This treatise states that
provisions stipulating the forfeiture of one tract upon alienation of another constitute a
"serious impediment" to the alienation of the tract whose sale triggers the forfeiture, and
should be void. Id. Gray questions whether Coke's approach was ever the law. J.C. GRAY,
supra note 67, § 29b.
85. See infra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
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tract right-the right to enjoy the use of funds at a sub-market
rate.
2. Percentage Sales
The "quarter-sale" provision typically has arisen in a deed
containing a covenant that upon conveyance by the grantee, one
fourth, or some other percentage, of the sale proceeds will be re-
served for the original grantor." From the seller's standpoint the
provision is the same as if a fine is levied on the event of aliena-
tion, except that the amount of the penalty varies with the sale
price and is payable from the proceeds. Although in this century
deeds have rarely contained this device, it was apparently a com-
mon provision in grants of farmland in New York in the early
nineteenth century.8 7 The New York Court of Appeals declared
these provisions invalid in the leading case of De Peyster v.
Michael 8 which now represents the majority rule in the United
States. 9 Although the early cases relied on the ground that such
reservations of interest were "repugnant" to a grant in fee simple, 0
a more recent case has recognized that important objectives of the
rule are to promote the free transferability of property and to en-
courage improvements.91
The effect of such a provision as a deterrent to alienation can
readily be seen. Upon sale the grantor realizes less than the full
value of his property and is thus motivated to retain it rather than
sacrifice some portion of the receipts. Percentage sale provisions do
not fall within the literal definition of restraints on alienation pro-
vided in section 404 of the Restatement of Property since they
contain no promise not to convey.92 The Restatement, however,
clearly rejects such a distinction as one of form over substance,
stating in the comments that "a promise to pay the original gran-
tor or some other person part of the resale price is a promise not to
86. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, § 26.68, at 512; RESTATEmENT OF
PROPERTY, supra note 11, § 413(2)(b).
87. See Overbagh v. Patrie, 8 Barb. 28, 33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1850).
88. 6 N.Y. 467 (1852).
89. See, e.g., White v. White, 105 N.J. Super. 184, 251 A.2d 470 (Ch. Div. 1969);
Dunlop v. Dunlop's Ex'rs, 144 Va. 297, 132 S.E. 351 (1926); Annot., 123 A.L.R. 1474 (1939).
90. See De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467, 494-509 (1852); Overbagh v. Patrie, 8 Barb.
28, 37-40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1850); Dunlop v. Dunlop's Ex'rs, 144 Va. 297, 309-10, 132 S.E. 351,
354 (1926).
91. See White v. White, 105 N.J. Super. 184, 190-92, 251 A.2d 470, 473-74 (Ch. Div.
1969).
92. See supra note 20.
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convey without so doing and hence is a promissory restraint. '93
Similarly, an acceleration clause, even though it contains no cove-
nant not to convey without consent, must be recognized as a prom-
issory restraint if the effect of acceleration is to impose a financial
penalty on the transferor.9 4 Percentage sale provisions can be dis-
tinguished in their effect from due-on-sale devices since the rela-
tive penalty for alienation imposed by a percentage sale remains
constant, but the penalty imposed by an interest rate differential
combined with a due-on-sale clause vanishes as the mortgage loan
is repaid. Nevertheless, a period of effective restraint under a due-
on-sale clause may extend for many years, and the "percentage" of
net proceeds that must be sacrificed by the seller may be large. In
the hypothetical set forth in section B above, if the due-on-sale
clause is enforceable, the seller realizes an equity of $50,000, com-
pared with a realization of $65,000 if he is able to "'sell'" his
mortgage. The reduction in net proceeds is almost one-fourth.
3. Preemptive Provisions
An owner of property who is bound by a preemptive provision
in a deed or contract must, prior to selling his property in a gen-
eral market, first offer to sell it to the holder of the preemption."
This provision should be distinguished from an option, under
whose terms the option holder need not wait until the landowner
desires to sell, but may demand sale under the option's terms."
Preemptive provisions have generally been treated as restraints on
alienation. 7
Recognizing that preemptive provisions may serve important
93. RE STATEmENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, § 404 comment g (citation omitted).
94. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. A recent case asserts that accelera-
tion clauses do not fall within the provisions of the Restatement of Property because a
promissory restraint must subject the contracting party to an action for damages or equita-
ble relief following breach of a contractual duty, see Crestview, Ltd. v. Foremost Ins. Co.,
621 S.W.2d 816, 825-26 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), and that "[i]n the context of promissory:
restraints, the 'duty' arises from the owner's promise not to convey his property without the
consent of the other contracting party." Id. at 825. As the words of comment g to § 404
quoted in the text make clear, however, the relevant duty is the duty of payment following
sale. Under the view that the relevant duty is the duty not to convey without consent, a
bond or letter of credit to be forfeited upon conveyance would not be a promissory restraint.
See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
95. See generally 6 AMEmcAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, §§ 26.64-.67; REsTATE-
MENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, § 413; 3 L. SIws & A. SMITH, supra note 11, § 1154;
Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 920 (1971).
96. See 6 AmEsRIcA LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, § 26.64.
97. See authorities cited supra note 95.
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social purposes, courts have allowed them to be enforced under
some circumstances.9 8 The Restatement of Property states that a
preemptive provision is valid if it requires the preemption holder
to meet the price of a third party offeror.9  By contrast, if the price
to be paid by the premption holder is fixed, the Restatement holds
the preemption unenforceable."'
The Restatement's dual rule for preemptive agreements is in
harmony with an approach to restraints on alienation that would
uphold or invalidate them according to their practical "lock-in" ef-
fect rather than their form. The authorities frequently have stated
that when a preemption is at the offeror's price, little restraining
effect results.10 1 Likewise, a preemption at a fixed price will be un-
enforceable because, as is typical in the cases, when the preemp-
tion price is substantially below the market price the owner will
not realize the full value of his property upon transfer, and he is
thus deterred from selling.
102
The restraining effect of the fixed price preemption frequently
arises in much the same way as does the restraining effect of the
due-on-sale clause. A price set in the agreement or deed appears
fair to the party or parties at the time of its execution, but it be-
comes a severe deterrent to alienation following a substantial rise
98. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 920, 931 (1971).
99. REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, § 413(1).
100. See id.; see also Inglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1980); Trecker v. Lan-
gel, 298 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1980); Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1955);
Tombari v. Blankenship-Dixon Co., 19 Wash. App. 145, 574 P.2d 401 (1978); authorities
cited supra note 95.
101. See 6 AMERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, § 26.66; 3 L. SimEs & A. SmTH,
supra note § 1154, at 62. But cf. Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 920, 927 (1971) (listing impediments to
sale imposed by offeror's price preemptive provision).
102. At least two recent opinions state that under § 413 of the Restatement of
Property fixed price preemptions are to be judged by a standard of reasonableness. See
Tovrea v. Umphress, 27 Ariz. App. 513, 556 P.2d 814 (1976); Trecker v. Langel, 298 N.W.2d
289 (Iowa 1980). Sections 406-412 of the Restatement of Property (to which fixed price
preemptions are referred by § 413), however, mandate that such preemptions be "governed
by the general rules as to restraints on alienation of estates in fee simple." W. FRATCHER,
supra note 11, at 87 (footnote omitted); see RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, §§
406-413. Under the Restatement's general rule, fixed-price preemptions are void without
regard to reasonableness. The Restatement holds that in the case of indefeasible possessory
estates in fee simple the rule of reasonableness has application only if "the restraint is quali-
fied so as to permit alienation to some though not all possible alienees." RESTATEmENT OF
PROPERTY, supra note 11, § 406(b). The drafters probably included this reasonableness ex-
ception as an accommodation to racially restrictive covenants, which were still common in
many states at the time of the Restatement's publication. See id. § 406 comments 1, m.
Clearly, a preemptive provision would be unreasonable under this test, since the number of
persons to whom alienation is excluded is very large-normally, all persons except the pre-
emption holder. See id. § 406 comments i, j, k.
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in general property values over time. Similarily, following a rise in
the market level of interest rates, a serious disincentive to aliena-
tion arises that was not present at the time of the execution of a
fixed rate mortgage. Courts which adopt the rule that a due-on-
sale clause is only enforceable when a lender's security is jeopard-
ized103 evidence a response that is analogous to the dual rule for
preemptive provisions. Since, in general, prospective real property
purchasers who will not jeopardize the lender's security interest
greatly outnumber those who do represent such a threat, the ap-
proach taken by these courts represents no practical restraint on
alienation.0
D. Integration of the Due-on-Sale Clause with the Doctrine of
Restraints
If a court wishes to acknowledge that due-on-sale clauses
should properly be considered restraints on alienation, it must in-
tegrate its holding-whether for or against enforcement-with the
jurisdiction's case law concerning such restraints. Commentators
have identified a majority doctrine and a minority doctrine of re-
straints on alienation.0 5 The majority doctrine "takes the view
that all restraints on alienation are void, unless they fall into rec-
ognized exception categories."10 6 The minority doctrine, on the
other hand, "holds that restraints on alienation of property are in-
valid only if unreasonable. ' 10 7 For many years the only jurisdiction
in the United States to have adopted the minority doctrine was
Kentucky.0 8 Although the Restatement of Property has taken the
majority position,10 9 in recent years, a number of jurisdictions have
expressly adopted the minority approach of "reasonableness" de-
terminedupon case-by-case inquiry.Y°
The tendency of some courts to keep separate an analysis of
103. See supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
104. The rationale of this approach is the same as that which permits restraind
against alienation of fee simple estates directed against a small group of persons, see supra
note 102--"the curtailment of alienation is insignificant in relation to the power of aliena-
tion which is permitted." RESTATEMENT OF PRoPERTY, supra note 11, § 406 comment j.
105. See Bernhard, supra note 11.
106. Id. at 1174.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1177-78.
109. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, §§ 404, 406.
110. See, e.g., Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 315-17, 392 P.2d 265, 268, 38
Cal. Rptr. 505, 508 (1964); Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 299-
301, 509 P.2d 1240, 1243 (1973).
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the due-on-sale clause from the doctrine of restraints on alienation
may result from a desire to avoid a shift from a "majority ap-
proach" to a "minority approach" when the court believes that the
clause should be enforceable under certain circumstances, but not
under others. In fact, both the majority and minority doctrines are
inherently flexible enough to accommodate any ruling that a court
sees fit to make.
One commentator has observed that in spite of the articulated
differences in approach between the majority and minority juris-
dictions, in practical operation they frequently function in much
the same way.' In a minority jurisdiction, even though a case-by-
case factual inquiry is permitted by doctrine in all instances, cer-
tain classes of restraints are so unreasonably restrictive that courts
would be unable to sustain them. In practical effect, a per se rule
would result for these classes of restraints."" Likewise, under the
majority doctrine as applied, considerations of reasonableness have
influenced not only the development of an extensive set of excep-
tion classes, but also the determination of an appropriate result
within a given class of exceptions." 3
When courts have acknowledged the restraining effect of the
due-on-sale clause and nevertheless found enforcement to be ap-
propriate, they have often termed the clause a "reasonable re-
straint."" 4 In jurisdictions in which the majority doctrine pre-
vailed at the time of the decision, courts have either tacitly created
an additional class exception to the rule against restraints," 5 or
they have taken the occasion to expressly adopt the minority rule
for the jurisdiction." 6 No logical reason forecloses the creation of a
new exception for due-on-sale clauses. The current exceptions are
not bound together by any pervasive characteristic that might be
wanting in the case of the due-on-sale clause. Instead, these excep-
111. See Bernhard, supra note 11, at 1177-78.
112. See id. at 1178 (giving as an example a perpetual disabling restraint on a fee).
113. See id. at 1181-86.
114. See cases cited supra notes 29-36.
115. See, e.g., Dunham v. Ware Sav. Bank, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1607, ,423 N.E.2d
998, 1001 (alternative holding that if due-on-sale clause is a restraint, it is a reasonable one);
Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 628, 224 S.E.2d 580, 586 (1976)
(citing as authority RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, § 410 comment a, but failing
to note that the comment addresses reasonable classes of restraints, not particular reasona-
ble restraints).
116. See Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 300, 509 P.2d
1240, 1243 (1973); cf. Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 921 n.25 (4th
Cir. 1981) (applying Virginia law; referring to "doctrine outlawing unreasonable restraints"
without distinguishing majority and minority doctrines).
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tions are merely a collection of situations in which per se applica-
tion of the rule would frustrate other worthwhile objectives.
117
That an exception for due-on-sale clauses has not been recognized
previously is understandable, since until recently the lending envi-
ronment had never been characterized by sharp swings in mortgage
rates combined with the widespread use of the long-term fixed rate
mortgage, the two conditions necessary for a serious restraining ef-
fect to arise."""
A number of jurisdictions have adopted the rule that a due-
on-sale clause may be enforced only if the lender can demonstrate
that enforcement is necessary to prevent impairment of the secur-
ity for his loan.119 In these jurisdictions, where the minority rule
has been adopted, such a holding amounts to a rule that the
lender's intention to protect his own financial interest through en-
forcement of the clause is unreasonable. 2 0 This rule at first glance
is irreconcilable with a majority approach that prohibits case-by-
case inquiry into the issue of reasonableness. The result, however,
is consistent with the majority doctrine because a requirement that
the grantee be creditworthy is not a significant restraint on aliena-
tion. No sacrifice is imposed on the seller by requiring that the
mortgage be assumed by one who can afford to meet its terms.1"'
117. This "class exception" approach was expressly adopted by the court in Baker v.
Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 IMI. 2d 119, 125-27, 333 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (1975) (importance
of certainty and stability of real estate titles precludes case-by-case inquiry into reasonable-
ness of consent-to-transfer clauses). See also Bakker v. Empire Say., Bldg. & Loan Ass'n,
634 P.2d 1021 (Colo. App. 1981). The Bakker court, in effect, interpreted Malouff v. Mid-
land Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973), to state that due-on-sale
clauses were per se reasonable as restraints on alienation, by holding that Malouff permitted
no case-by-case inquiry on the issue of reasonableness. Bakker, 634 P.2d at 1023.
118. The due-on-sale clause cases are numerous enough to have inspired a new topic
in the Chapter dealing with restraints on alienation in Simes' and Smith's treatise on future
interests: "Restraints for Protection of Mortgagees and Land Contract Vendors." 3 L. SImzs
& A. SMITH, supra note 11, § 1164 (Supp. 1982).
119. See supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 952, 582 P.2d 970, 976, 148
Cal. Rptr. 379, 385 (1978); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163,
174. 250 N.W.2d 804, 808 (1977).
121. See supra note 104. If a lender wished to obtain an injunction against sale to an
uncreditworthy buyer, a consent-to-transfer clause barring alienation to "the un-
creditworthy" might well be found specifically enforceable under a recognized exception to
the rule against restraints. This exception-that a restraint is permissible if alienation is
prohibited to some but not all possible alienees-applies even to fee simple estates. See
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, § 406. Furthermore, the drafters of the Restate-
ment added a "reasonableness" requirement to the class exception. See RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY, supra note 11, § 406(c). An exception class of "restraints for the protection of
mortgagees, where reasonable" would thus arguably be consistent with the approach of the
Restatement of Property. See also Crestview, Ltd. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 621 S.W.2d 816
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This reasoning is in effect the response of the majority doctrine to
the preemptive provision,122 since by adopting a rule that only
preemptions at the offeror's price are allowable, the doctrine limits
the invocation of the majority rule to the class of cases in which
restraining effect is possible-the preemption at a fixed price.
E. Economic Significance and Legality of Due-on-Sale
Restraint
Once a court has recognized that the due-on-sale clause may
act as a restraint on alienation, it must determine whether to allow
enforcement in spite of that effect. The proper inquiry on this is-
sue requires a balancing of the social welfare loss that results from
the "lock-in" effect of the automatically enforceable clause against
any social welfare loss that would result if the clause were not au-
tomatically enforceable. If a net welfare gain can be realized by
declaring the device not automatically enforceable, a court should
do so. This potential net welfare gain has been the justification for
the rule against restraints on alienation.
12 3
1. Traditional Objectives of the Rule Against Restraints
In justifying the rule against restraints most courts have fo-
cused on the social and economic consequences of the availability
or unavailability of a particular device rather than on the effect
upon the parties in the particular case under consideration. Para-
mount among the reasons that courts have offered for the rule
against restraints is that restraints on alienability inhibit the free
transferability of land and take property out of commerce.124 One
(Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
If the clause in issue did constitute a restraint on alienation, we would nevertheless be
required to enforce it in this case because it is expressly qualified by the requirement of
reasonable conduct on the part of the noteholder, which implies that alienation is per-
mitted to some though not all possible alienees.
Id. at 826-27 (citing RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, § 406). The court, however,
failed to note that this argument can apply only to the clause as used to protect the lender
against uncreditworthy transferees, unless the lender asserts that he would attempt to force
escalation of a mortgage's interest rate to market levels only in the event of conveyance to a
limited number of such transferees, and not transferees generally. Such an assertion would
seem incredible.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 95-102.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 68-73.
124. Courts and commentators have also suggested that restraints on alienation are
repugnant to a grant in fee simple, that they promote the concentration of wealth, that (in
the form of spendthrift trusts) they allow the "survival of the least fit" by protecting per-
sons from their own foolishness, that they may allow creditors to be abused, and that they
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modern writer has further particularized the undesirable social ef-
fects of the clog on transferability:
The undesirable effects on society potentially resulting from this include: (1)
the unnatural increase in the market value of property which might result if
restraints were widely employed in a particular locale; (2) the discouragement
of improvements to the property, since it may be unprofitable to the owner to
make such improvements while threatened with such restraint; (3) the ham-
pering of the most effective use of property, if a prospective purchaser would
be a more effective user than the present owners; and (4) the removal from
trade of an increasing amount of the national capital.12
The Restatement of Property articulates an additional rationale
for the rule that has frequently been offered and that may have
relevance to a consideration of the due-on-sale device. The Re-
statement concludes that restraints on alienation of land prevent
the ownership of property from being "responsive to the current
exigencies of its . . .owners. "126 This concern may not reflect a
strictly social objective since under certain circumstances society
may benefit if a property owner is forced to sacrifice a future abil-
ity to profitably transfer his property for a benefit that accrues to-
day. To the extent, however, that society has an interest in
preventing at their inception bargains that, though legally enforce-
able, yield harsh results, this rationale may also be included in the
list of desirable social welfare goals of the rule against restraints.
2. The Balancing Process
Measuring what social costs may attend the use of due-on-sale
clauses is admittedly difficult. This difficulty may explain some
courts' insistence on limiting their discussion to an inquiry of the
effects enforcement would have on the parties to the mortgage con-
tract.127 Since, however, a decision for or against enforcement nec-
essarily implies some judgment of the cost to society of the re-
straint, a considered inquiry should be made.128
run counter to the policy against dead hand control. See Bernhard, supra note 11, at 1179-
81.
125. Id. at 1179-80.
126. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, §§ 404-423 introductory note.
127. See, e.g., Williams v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 923 n.29 (4th
Cir. 1981); Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 950-51, 582 P.2d 970, 974-76, 148
Cal. Rptr. 379, 383-85 (1978).
128. Since the rule against restraints seeks to protect the general interest of society,
the issue of the due-on-sale clause, and perhaps the issue of restraints on alienation in gen-
eral, is arguably better left to legislative resolution. See Enforcement, supra note 10, at 935;
Crestview, Ltd. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 621 S.W.2d 816, 824 n.8 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981). The
rule against restraints, however, has traditionally been developed as part of the common
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(a) The Welfare Loss
The primary source of loss to society resulting from the wide-
spread use of the due-on-sale device during times of rising interest
rates is the tendency to "freeze" or "lock-in" resources with the
resultant obstruction of commerce and productivity. The hypo-
thetical proposed in part II of this Note129 demonstrates that the
reluctance of an individual to incur a financial loss upon sale of his
home might prevent society from enjoying the benefits of increased
productivity that would otherwise result from the free flow of
human capital. The social importance of the mobility of human
resources is evidenced by the large sums that corporations spend
to move employees to the facilities where they are most needed.
Equally important is a corresponding impediment to the free flow
of property resources to their most efficient use. If a merchant who
owns a shop on a given site is deterred from selling and building a
new shop elsewhere while he "waits out" his mortgage, buyers in
the prospective site are also forced to wait to be served by him.130
law, and no compelling reasons exist to restrain courts from deciding the enforceability of
due-on-sale clauses. Most legislative action to date has limited or forbidden enforcement of
the clauses. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-806.01 (1974) (no transfer fee in excess of
$100 or 1% of balance due upon transfer of interest by trustor; no interest rate increase
allowed when trustor remains liable on note; application of statute limited to residential
property of 4 or fewer units); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 3301, 3002 (Supp. 1981) (interest rate in-
crease upon transfer limited to 1%); IowA CODE ANN. § 535.8(2)(C) (West Supp. 1981) (due-
on-sale clauses void for one- or two-family dwellings unless security impaired); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 48-7-12 (Supp. 1981) (due-on-sale clauses void for four-unit and smaller residential
housing unless security impaired). But see LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 837A (West Supp. 1981)
(granting lenders option to accelerate loan upon conveyance without reference to the inclu-
sion of due-on-sale clause in mortgage agreement); cf. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Kelly,
312 N.W.2d 476, 479 (S.D. 1981) (construing S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. § 21-49-13(7) (Supp.
1981) as legislative mandate to enforce due-on-sale clauses).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 68-75.
130. The issue of enforcement of due-on-sale clauses as applied to commercial proper-
ties points up the importance of considering society's interests. Employment of an analysis
that is designed to justify a particular result in one case, but that considers only private
interests, may lead to inappropriate results in later cases when, although the social interests
remain constant, the private interests that underlie the analysis have changed. In Dawn Inv.
Co. v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 439, 172 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1981), the court held that
"private" noninstitutional lenders could demand automatic enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses. The court distinguished the Dawn situation from that in Wellenkamp v. Bank of
Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978) (holding that "institutional"
lenders could not demand automatic enforcement of due-on-sale clauses), see 116 Cal. App.
3d at -, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 143, since in Dawn the lenders were individuals, the property
involved was an apartment building and not subject to "the public policy favoring the pro-
tection of equity in a person's home," and the parties were more equal in bargaining power.
116 Cal. App. 3d. at -_, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 145. None of these distinctions, however, bears on
the social welfare interest of stimulating the efficient use of resources by promoting the free
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The social losses related to such impediments are difficult to
quantify, but they are certainly significant. The impediment to
alienation imposed by the due-on-sale clause can be compared to
another impediment that is triggered by the sale of property-the
capital gains tax.?sl Although the losses associated with the imposi-
tion of a capital gains tax upon sale are probably no more quantifi-
able than those associated with due-on-sale clauses, the undesir-
able economic effects associated with the "lock-in" of assets caused
by the capital gains tax have long been recognized,"3 2 and many
commentators have suggested proposals for tax reforms that would
eliminate "lock-in."1 33
Another social cost attributable to due-on-sale clauses is the
vast effort that has been expended by individuals and corporations
to avoid triggering them. When circumstances force an owner of
property to vacate, and when, absent a sub-market rate mortgage
with a due-on-sale clause, he would sell; in a substantial number of
cases he will choose to lease rather than pay off the mortgage. To
the extent that individuals and businesses are thus unwillingly
forced to become landlords, due-on-sale clauses create another
source of social waste manifested in the cost of setting up and
maintaining the landlord-tenant relationship, frequently across
transferability of property. This interest is endangered at least as much, and perhaps more,
when valuable commercial properties are "locked-in" to their current ownership as when
residential properties are similarly locked-in.
131. Under current income tax law, a property owner's income in the form of appreci-
ation of property is not recognized and taxed until the sale of that property. See I.R.C. §
1001(c) (1976). The tax thus imposes a financial "penalty" upon a property owner that is
triggered by sale. If gain is to be recognized upon sale, an owner of investment property will
shift his investment only if the yield on the new investment is sufficiently higher than the
yield on the old to compensate for the reduced amount of the new investment the owner will
be able to purchase with the proceeds remaining after payment of the capital gains tax.
132. With respect to real property especially, the Internal Revenue Code seems to ac-
knowledge these effects. The tax law contains a number of provisions that tend to reduce or
eliminate this lock-in effect for various types of property transactions. See, e.g., I.R.C. §
1031 (1976) (nonrecognition granted for like-kind exchange); id. § 1202 (Supp. III 1979 &
West Supp. 1981) (deduction of part of capital gain from gross income); id. § 1304 (1976,
Supp. III 1979 & West Supp. 1981) (rollover of gain upon sale of principal residence).
133. See, e.g., Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES
247, 256-59 (1957); David, Economic Effects of the Capital Gains Tax, AM. ECON. REV.,
May 1964, at 288, 293; Holt & Shelton, The Lock-In Effect of the Capital Gains Tax, 15
NAT'L TAX J. 337, 352 (1962) (asserting that lock-in effect is "the principal basis for the
attack on the capital gains tax"); Waggoner, Eliminating the Capital Gains Preference.
Part 1. The Problems of Inflation, Bunching and Lock-In, 48 U. COLo. L. REv. 313, 366-97
(1977). Among the solutions that have been suggested are (1) the income taxation of appre-
ciation at the time of death, see Waggoner, supra, at 372-75; Holt & Shelton, supra, at 352;
and (2) the taxation of gain without relation to sale, see Waggoner, supra, at 375-86.
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long distances. The same sort of societal cost results when courts
decide to enforce due-on-sale clauses with respect to outright sales,
but not with respect to installment land sale transactions.13 4 Little
justification exists for artificially stimulating the use of this much
criticized device 3 5 by granting special amnesty from the effect of
the due-on-sale clause.
(b) Social Benefits of the Due-on-Sale Clause
The economic theory of contracts holds that a net economic
gain is associated with any exchange of goods because each party
to a contract is assumed to be better off after entering the contract
than he was before.136 Since the due-on-sale clause is one aspect of
a mortgage contract, benefits presumptively accrue to both parties
upon the mutually bargained for and assented to inclusion of such
a clause, and hence a loss will be imposed on the parties to a mort-
gage contract if the law will not enforce the parties' bargain. 13 7 The
sum of these losses must be weighed against society's potential
welfare gain to determine whether society will receive a net gain if
courts rule against automatic enforcement.
Many benefits flow from use of the mortgage device. From a
lender's standpoint real estate is among the most desirable forms
of loan security because it is generally slow to decpreciate (and will
more typically increase in value in step with inflation), the broad
market for real property assures stability of market value, theft is
difficult, destruction can be insured against, and title may be as-
certained with a high degree of certainty. The mortgage, therefore,
is an ideal vehicle for the lender who wishes to invest funds in
large amounts and for long terms and thereby minimize the ratio
of transaction cost to interest earned. From the borrower's stand-
point the stable security value of real estate enables him to borrow
funds at a high ratio of loan amount to property value and thus
maximizes his ability to discount a future income stream and' ac-
quire in the present a commodity on which the typical individual
134. See Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1974).
135. See Nelson & Whitman, The Installment Land Contract-A National View-
point, 1977 B.Y.U. L. Rav. 541; Note, Toward Abolishing Installment Land Sale Contracts,
36 MONT. L. REV. 110, 118 (1975) (suggesting statutory system as substitute for installment
land sale contract).
136. See A. KRONMAN & R. POSNan, THE ECONOMICS OF CoNmACT LAW 1-2 (1979).
137. The loss will be imposed on parties who desire to enter into mortgage contracts
containing an automatically enforceable due-on-sale clause, but who will not enter such con-
tracts if they know that courts will not enforce the clause.
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desires to spend a very high percentage of his earnings-housing.
The long-term fixed rate mortgage also permits the borrower to
commit a high proportion of his earnings to housing, since he can
predict its cost with a high degree of certainty.
Clearly these mutual advantages to borrower and lender do
not all vanish upon the elimination of the due-on-sale clause. The
automatically enforceable due-on-sale clause in a mortgage lending
scheme does not alter the quality of real estate as loan security,
but instead merely serves to decrease the length of time the aver-
age loan is outstanding, and thereby decrease the considerable in-
terest rate risk that a lender undertakes when he extends a fixed
rate loan of thirty years duration. The due-on-sale clause neither
increases nor decreases the total amount of interest rate risk;
rather, the clause simply serves to reallocate that risk between the
lender and the borrower. Without the due-on-sale clause, however,
the lender's risk can be allievated by some other means or be com-
pensated through an increased rate of interest.
Some courts have suggested that without the due-on-sale de-
vice lenders would abandon the long-term fixed rate mortgage as
too risky."3 8 Even with strict judicial enforcement, however, the
due-on-sale clause may not be a sufficiently protective device to
guarantee the continued viability of the long-term fixed rate mort-
gage in the current interest rate environment. Since the borrower
under a due-on-sale mortgage only activates the clause when he
transfers the property, and since his decision to transfer the prop-
erty cannot be compelled, the clause has an uncertain and haphaz-
ard effect as a risk reducer. Lenders have predicted the period that
an "average" loan is expected to remain outstanding on the basis
of past experience. In a market in which current long-term rates
greatly exceed those contained in existing mortgages, large num-
bers of prospective sellers undoubtedly will lease properties rather
than forego the economic advantage inherent in their current
mortgages, and thereby will thwart the lender's purpose. Moreover,
when interest rates fluctuate rapidly, the term-shortening effect of
the due-on-sale clause will not be sufficient to reduce to a tolerable
level the interest rate risk associated with the fixed rate mortgage.
To protect themselves against the increased level of risk asso-
ciated with the current volatility of interest rates, lenders have de-
138. See Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 303, 509 P.2d




veloped other risk-shifting means more effective than the due-on-
sale clause. Some of these other devices, including the variable rate
mortgage and the rollover mortgage,1 39 shift the interest rate risk
to the borrower. These devices are less attractive to the borrower,
because he is less able to predict the future cost or availability of
mortgage financing. 140 Although some lenders undoubtedly will
continue to shoulder the entire risk, but will be compensated by an
increased rate of interest,14" ' neither the lender nor the borrower
need absorb the interest rate risk. The replacement of payable-on-
demand savings by long-term mortgage pool investment as a
source of mortgage funds has proceeded at a rapid rate in the last
several years. 142 Investors who for years have supplied funds to the
long-term corporate and government bond markets, and who are
increasingly providing those funds to the mortgage markets, are
better able to shoulder the interest rate risk of long-term loan
commitments than is the individual property owner. Moreover,
savings institutions have increasingly been able to shift rate risk to
third parties by moving away from payable-on-demand savings to-
wards funding sources that more appropriately match their
assets.
139. See Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471, 482
n.15 (Minn. 1981); Volkmer, supra note 11, at 799.
140. Whether the variable rate mortgage in fact imposes a significant burden on the
mortgagor has been the subject of substantial debate. See, e.g., Findlay & Capozza, The
Variable Rate Mortgage and Risk in the Mortgage Market: An Option Theory Perspective,
9 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 356, 364 (1977) (suggesting that savings and loan associa-
tions could use variable rate mortgages to solve forecasting and pricing problems "with the
possibility of no adverse effects on the consumer") and authorities cited therein.
141. See The Business Struggles to Market the RRM, SAy. & LOAN NEws, July 1980,
at 31.
We're not anxious to sell mortgages with a 29-year fixed-rate any more than anyone
else wants to sell a product for 29 years at a fixed price. . . . [Still], . . we'll reinstate
the fixed-rate mortgage if competitive pressures dictate we should, but maybe we'll
offer it with an extra half point.
Id. at 32 (Comment of Rowland J. Bartow, Chairman, Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
Chicago).
142. See U.S. LEAGUE OF SAVINGS ASS'N, SAVINGS AND LOAN FACT BOOK '80 (1980). "In
1977, private institutions for the first time offered conventional mortgage-backed pass-
through securities without the sponsorship of federal agencies. . . . By year-end 1979 the
mortgage pools represented 12% of the total mortgage debt outstanding on one- to four-
family housing and 5.2% of the mortgage debt on multi-family housing units." Id. at 35.
143. The savings and loan industry is in the process of vigorous exploration for new
ways to reduce their interest rate risk exposure, many of which do not place this risk on the
consumer's shoulders. See Bush, Pension Funds Can Help Rescue Housing, SAV. & LOAN
NEws, Sept. 1981, at 65; Frank, Making Money in the New World Depends on Achieving
the Proper Fit of Assets and Liabilities, SAy. & LOAN NEws, Aug. 1981, at 80; Frank, Finan-
cial Futures: Major New Weapons to Combat Soaring Interest Rates, SAv. & LOAN NEws,
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Courts that have upheld due-on-sale clauses have frequently
cited fairness to lenders as grounds for enforcement."", These
courts quite reasonably find that lenders who have relied on previ-
ous decisions in developing their lending policies and drawing their
mortgage instruments should not be deprived of a contractual right
in which they have a considerable investment. By limiting the ap-
plication of a ruling striking down the due-on-sale clause to mort-
gages executed after the date of the decision, however, a willing
court could avoid any unfairness to lenders. If such a decision
amounts to the overruling of prior case law, a ruling that is only
prospective in effect will normally be appropriate when parties
have negotiated and accepted contract terms in justifiable reliance
on precedential authority.
145
If a jurisdiction were to decide to apply a ruling invalidating
due-on-sale clauses both retrospectively and prospectively, some
courts have suggested that a further social loss would result be-
cause future borrowers would have to bear the burden of artifi-
cially high interest rates as lenders "make up" for losses associated
with the unenforceability of the clauses in their outstanding mort-
gages.' 4" This argument, however, is not economically sound. A
lender in a competitive market will make loans as long as a suffi-
cient prospective spread exists between the anticipated interest
cost of acquiring funds and the anticipated interest revenue to
support the use of the capital required. Certainly a single lender
whose "due-on-sale losses" were particularly heavy could not at-
tract customers if it attempted to "catch up" by charging rates
above the market. Neither will an entire industry be able to charge
excessive rates and "catch up," absent collusion. The loss to lend-
ers following a decision invalidating due-on-sale clauses will in fact
be imposed on the owners of the lenders' capital,14 7 and will be a
one-time windfall loss. While future interest rates may be raised to
some extent by the resulting depletion of the institutions' capital,
July 1981, at 62.
144. See, e.g., supra note 18.
145. See Safarik v. Udall, 304 F.2d 944, 949-50 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Cascade Sec. Bank v.
Butler, 22 Wash. 2d 777, 784-85, 567 P.2d 631, 635 (1977); Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 1371, at §
5[b] (1966).
146. See Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 916-17 (4th Cir.
1981); Dunham v. Ware Say. Bank, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1607, -, 423 N.E.2d 998, 1003-04.
147. This statement rests on the assumption that the institution remains solvent. If it
does not, losses not insured by the government may be borne by depositors. That such an
insolvency had been caused by the loss of the enforceable due-on-sale clause, however,
would be difficult to demonstrate.
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if the assumption is valid that such institutions will be able to op-
erate profitably in the future after recovering from losses already
inherent in loan portfolios, new capital for current loans should be
attracted to the point of economic equilibrium with other
investments. 14 8
IV. CONTRACT LAW LIMITATIONS TO ENFORCEMENT OF
DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSES
If a court concludes that automatically enforceable due-on-
sale clauses should not be declared illegal as restraints on aliena-
tion, or if it decides that the application of a rule prohibiting their
automatic enforcement should have only prospective effect, it
should still refuse to enforce a clause if such enforcement would
violate contract law principles. Two related doctrines are in-
volved-the law of contract interpretation and the law of stan-
dardized agreements or adhesion contracts. Although the law of re-
straints on alienation does not and should not focus on the status
and contracting behavior of the parties, a contract law analysis
may logically lead a court to determine that different rules may be
appropriate in different settings and enables the court to differen-
tiate between the individual lender and the institutional lender,
and between the consumer borrower and commercial borrower.
A. Interpretation of the Contract
In many of the due-on-sale clause decisions in which courts
invoke the powers of equity and declare the clause unfair, the ac-
tual bases for such rulings appear to lie in the law of contract in-
terpretation.14 9 Courts, for example, often hold that enforcement
would be inequitable when the lender's goal is to obtain an in-
creased rate or a transfer fee because these adjustments do not fur-
ther the "purpose" contemplated by the clause's inclusion in the
mortgage contract. Such holdings are, in effect, declarations that as
a matter of common understanding and usage, due-on-sale clauses
148. See generally Kalish & McKenzie, Portfolio Drag and Savings and Loan Lend-
ing Policy, Q. Rav. oF EcoN. & Bus., Summer, 1979, at 77.
The empirical results indicated that for the entire sample of savings and loan associa-
tions and for the subsample operating in nonconcentrated markets the past portfolio
yield had no effect on the current mortgage rate. There was, however, a [statistically]
significant relationship in the sample of associations operating in concentrated
markets.
Id. at 77.
149. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
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are employed by lenders only in order to provide themselves a veto
over assumption of their mortgages by uncreditworthy persons.
When it adopts this reasoning, a court implies that the mortgagor
assented to the potential enforcement of the term for this purpose
only. The wording of the clause itself may reinforce this conclu-
sion, 150 or courts may derive this interpretation from the circum-
stances surrounding the execution of the contract.151 Alternatively,
the decision not to enforce may be explained as an interpretation
of the contract contra proferentem-if the contract can reasonably
be interpreted to give the lender only a right to protect his secur-
ity, then this interpretation should be adopted, since it is the inter-
pretation least favorable to its drafter, the lender. 152 Under either
mode of analysis no resort need be made to the principles of adhe-
sion contracts or unconscionability.
Insofar as the interpretation of a contract term is an attempt
to ascertain its "meaning," s5 3 that meaning must relate to the time
when the parties entered into the contract.15 4 Given the long-term
nature of most mortgage contracts, courts must seek to determine
the generally understood meaning and purpose of the due-on-sale
clause at the time of its inception, and, importantly, give consider-
ation to any traditional practices peculiar to a given jurisdiction. 55
150. See, e.g., First S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Britton, 345 So. 2d 300, 301-02 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1977) (upon mortgagee's consent to transfer, mortgagee might make "reasonable
charge for services in effecting transfer"), overruled, Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485, 487
(Ala. 1980); Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583, 584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (agreement
gave mortgagee the "right and privilege of accepting or rejecting, or passing on credit, etc. of
each successor in ownership").
151. Those courts that have asserted that the purpose of the due-on-sale clause is to
assure the lender's security necessarily imply the existence of some usage of trade to that
effect in the mortgage lending business. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 49.
153. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 49, § 200.
154. See, e.g., 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 49, § 535, at 16 n.14 (1960).
Thus the term "Grand Coulee Dam" is a proper name and always has been; yet it could
be used at one period and by certain persons to mean a proposed low dam across the
Columbia River, not yet built; it could continue to be used with that meaning even
after the government had determined upon the erection of a much higher dam, after
the higher dam was under construction, and even after it had been completed. The
court was quite right in holding that, at the time of making the contract, the meaning
of the parties had shifted to the higher dam.
Id. (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 836 (D. Minn. 1946)).
155. Of course, the mortgage itself may state its purpose. Mortgage clauses that have
appeared in the more recent cases have often stated the lender's purpose in relatively clear
terms. See, e.g., Patton v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473, 578 P.2d 152 (1978)
(mortgage in issue gave the lender the option to accelerate upon transfer without consent,
and the lender "shall have the contractual right to withhold its consent ... where ... the
existing interest rate of this loan is less than the current interest rate"); First Fed. Sav. &
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In the context of the consumer home mortgage, an "average" bor-
rower in 1982 arguably would have reason to know that a lender
might wish to enforce a due-on-sale clause in order to exact a
higher interest charge.156 By contrast, for mortgages executed prior
to the onset of the extreme rate volatility in the early 1970's, a
court might find more reasonable the assumption that borrowers
would have been justifiably surprised to learn the mortgagor re-
served an absolute right to refuse assumption, subject to any
financial inducement that could be extracted. 157 In states that, at
the mortgage's inception, had usury ceilings that severely limited
the lender's ability to raise interest rates, a belief that mortgages
are normally assumable might have been much more widespread
than in states where the lender's right to charge what the market
will bear was more readily acknowledged. That so many courts
have determined as a matter of law that the purpose of the due-
on-sale clause is to enhance the lender's security interest, rather
than to mitigate the lender's interest rate risk,158 should serve as
strong evidence that their conclusion is at least an alternative rea-
sonable meaning to be ascribed to the clause.15 9 Since the contract
Loan Ass'n v. Kelly, 312 N.W.2d 476, 477 (S.D. 1981) (mortgage in issue stipulated that
assuming buyer must agree that "the interest payable ... shall be at such rate as Lender
shall request").
156. With interest rates at their present levels, the public has been increasingly ex-
posed to financial and economic information. The concept of the money supply, once a con-
cern of economists and bankers only, has now become a subject that warrants even televi-
sion news coverage. Still, a large segment of potential mortgage borrowers probably would
not anticipate a due-on-sale clause in a mortgage and would not comprehend the implica-
tions of such a clause.
157. See, e.g., Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1980).
The traditional and customary purpose of the "due on sale" clause has been to protect
against impairment of the lender's security . . . . A majority of this Court has rewrit-
ten the agreement between the parties in the instant case and the meaning of the "due
on sale" clause in many other existing agreements so that the clause may legally be
used for the hidden purpose, not within the contemplation of the parties when they
signed the agreement, of allowing the mortgagee upon default to condition his accept-
ance . . . upon the transferee's agreement to pay a higher rate of interest than the
interest agreed to in the contract. . . . A majority of this Court would allow one party
to a contract to . . . give new meanings to old terms with well settled meanings.
Id. at 488-89 (Torbert, J., dissenting).
158. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
159. But see Crestview, Ltd. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 621 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981).
The "due on sale clause" is broad but not ambiguous. There can be no reasonable
doubt of its intended meaning. . ..
The wording of the clause is singularly inapt to express a contractual intention
that it be narrowly limited in its effect to one particular circumstance, that is, where a
sale by the owner threatens to impair the security of the debt, and ineffective or inap-
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is then to be construed against the drafter, the interpretation most
favorable to the borrower must prevail. 60 If the lender has specifi-
cally provided that his intention is to raise the interest rate to
market levels, the principles of contract law will, of course, pro-
duce the opposite result. 6' Similarly, the lender will prevail if the
borrower drafted the agreement.
That a mortgage contract may be interpreted to preclude the
enforcement of a due-on-sale clause for reasons not related to the
lender's security does not mean that a court must engage in a case-
by-case inquiry to determine whether the particular borrower knew
or should have known that a lender might wish to enforce the
clause to increase his return. Under the position taken by section
211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, "Standardized
Agreements" are to be interpreted "as treating alike all those simi-
larly situated.' ' 62 The comments add that "courts in construing
and applying the standardized contract seek to effectuate the rea-
sonable expectations of the average member of the public who ac-
cepts it. The result may be to give the advantage of a restrictive
reading to some sophisticated customers who contracted with
knowledge of an ambiguity or dispute."'6 3 The construction of
standardized contracts in this fashion not only promotes judicial
efficiency but also has the salutary effect of stimulating the issuers
of such contracts to draft them in such a way that an average bor-
rower can understand exactly what he is undertaking.'"
plicable with respect to all other sales.
Id. at 820. The parties originating the mortgage in Crestview were a partnership and an
insurance company, and the property was an office building with a value of $1,000,000.
160. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 49, § 206. "In choosing
among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement. . . , that meaning is generally
preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing
otherwise proceeds." Id.
161. Cf. Provident Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. Realty Centre, Ltd., 428 N.E.2d 170, 173
(Ill. App. 1981) (dictum) (suggesting a rule that due-on-sale clauses should not be enforced
for purpose of allowing interest rate increase unless such purpose is expressly stated).
162. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 49, § 211(2).
163. Id. comment e. This approach is justified on the ground that the "sophisticated
customer" has no more choice in acceptance or rejection of the term than does the unsophis-
ticated customer. Murray, The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized Agreements
Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1342, 1387-89 (1975).
164. The resistance of lenders to drafting agreements that an average borrower can
understand persists. In Squires, A Comprehensible Due-on-Sale Clause (with form), 27
PRAC. LAW. 67 (April 15, 1981), reprinted in ALI-ABA CLE REV., Sept. 25, 1981, at 1, col. 1
(pt. 1), Oct. 2, 1981, at 6, col. 1 (pt. 2), the author argues that the due-on-sale language of
the standard mortgage and deed of trust instrument of the Federal National Mortgage Asso-
ciation/Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation is "labyrinthine" and that it does little to
advance the layman's understanding of what he is signing. Id. at 71, reprinted in ALI-ABA
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An analogous issue of contract interpretation arises in lease
contract terms relating to assignment or sublease. 165 Although sec-
tion 15.2 of the Restatement (Second) of Property approaches this
problem as an issue of restraints on alienation,' the solution takes
the color of contract law: the landlord may not unreasonably refuse
consent to an assignment or sublease "unless a freely negotiated
provision in the lease gives the landlord an absolute right to with-
hold consent.' 6 7 Although the section does not explicitly state
that withholding consent to assignment for the purpose of ob-
taining a rent increase is unreasonable, some courts have stated
such a rule. 68 Under this view, the Restatement's position forces
the conclusion that the lessor's refusal of consent for the purpose
of demanding a rent increase is not inherently unreasonable, but
that to interpret the contract to confer such a right would be un-
reasonable, absent an express contractual term providing for it. A
rule for due-on-sale clauses that parallels the rule of section 15.2 of
the Restatement (Second) of Property would mandate nonenforce-
ment if the lender's purpose in refusing consent to assumption is
to demand an increase in the interest rate, unless the lender has
expressly reserved such a right in his contract. 6 9
B. Unconscionability/Adhesion Analysis
An independent contract law basis for a ruling that a due-on-
CLE REV., Sept. 25, 1981, at 5, col. 2. The comment of Michael H. Cardozo, Member, Com-
mittee on Legal Drafting, American Bar Association, which accompanies the reprint, sug-
gests that "the seed of excessive litigation can be planted by 'lawyers language.'" ALI-ABA
CLE REV., Sept. 25, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
165. This analogy was drawn in Comment, Debtor-Selection Provisions Found in
Trust Deeds and the Extent of Their Enforceability in the Courts, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 475,
487-90 (1962).
166. The Restatement states,
Restraints on Alienation
(2) A restraint on alienation without the consent of the landlord of the tenant's inter-
est in the leased property is valid, but the landlord's consent to an alienation by the
tenant cannot be withheld unreasonably, unless a freely negotiated provision in the
lease gives the landlord an absolute right to withhold consent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 15.2 (1977).
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden, 350 So. 2d 1035, 1037-38 (Ala.
1977); Ringwood Assocs., Ltd. v. Jack's of Route 23, Inc., 153 N.J. Super. 294, 303, 379 A.2d
508, 512 (Law Div. 1977). Contra B & R. Oil Co. v. Ray's Mobile Homes, Inc., 139 Vt. 122,
122-23, 422 A.2d 1267, 1267-68 (1980) (expressly rejecting position of the RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF PROPERTY, supra note 166, § 15.2).
169. The court in Provident Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Realty Centre, Ltd., 428
N.E.2d 170 (Ill. App. 1981), suggested the adoption of such a rule.
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sale clause may not be enforced is that the clause is one of adhe-
sion and that its enforcement would be unconscionable or unfair.
The doctrine of adhesion contracts is premised on the idea that in
some circumstances a court should refuse enforcement of a provi-
sion of a standardized form contract imposed by one of the parties
even though enforcement would be granted if the parties had nego-
tiated and prepared the writing together.170 The typical homeown-
er/borrower mortgage contract, and probably many commercial
mortgages, fall into this pattern.
The law of adhesion contracts is still at an early stage of de-
velopment. The authorities disagree substantially over what should
be the philosophical basis for specialized treatment7 and in what
ways courts should give effect to adhesion contracts and terms.
This Note makes no attempt to summarize the law of adhesion
contracts; it does attempt, however, to determine whether a court
might conclude that the borrower would not reasonably expect to
find such a clause in a mortgage contract-would be "surprised"
by it-or that the due-on-sale clause is in some way "unfair."
Either finding may serve to justify invalidation of the clause under
an adhesion contract analysis.
1. Surprise
Signers of mutually negotiated contracts are not absolutely
precluded from relief against unexpected terms. Nevertheless, in
accordance with the "special effect"17' that the law traditionally
accords written agreements as formal "manifestations of assent,
1 7 3
absent a showing of fraud, mistake, or some other major flaw in the
contractual scheme, courts will not grant relief from the terms of a
170. See generally 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 49, § 559; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS, supra note 49, § 211; Dugan, Standardized Form Contracts-An Introduction, 24
WAYNE L. REV. 1307 (1978); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Free-
dom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
171. See, e.g., 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 49, §§ 559A-559I (Supp. 1980) (discussing adhe-
sion contracts under topic "Interpretation"); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 9-44 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing adhesion contracts under topic "Duty to Read"); J.
MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 350 (2d ed. 1974) (discussing adhesion contracts under
topic "Unconscionability"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 49, § 211(3)
& comment f (dealing with "standardized agreements" under topic "Effect of Adoption of a
Writing" but suggesting that the rule is closely related to unconscionability and
interpretation).
172. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 49, §§ 209-218 introduc-
tory note.
173. See J. MURRAY, supra note 171, § 19.
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written contract.1'" The barriers to relief from an unexpected term
in an adhesion contract are less formidable.
In an adhesion contract setting courts recognize that those
who assent to such contracts do not normally read them.17 5 Courts
also recognize that as a matter of social policy it may not be desira-
ble that adhesion contracts be read by those who sign them,176 and
that many who sign such contracts would be incapable of compre-
hending them even if they were to attempt a reading.177 A court,
therefore, should not allow a mortgagee to benefit from a standard-
ized term incorporated in a mortgage contract that the borrower
would not reasonably expect to find in such a contract.
Whether due-on-sale clauses are "reasonably expectable" in
mortgages may vary according to the date and place that the con-
tract was executed, and this inquiry parallels the inquiry into the
proper interpretation of the contract. Interpretation, however, is
not at issue in an adhesion analysis-the court may refuse to en-
force the clause even though it clearly states that the lender in-
tends to enforce the clause whenever possible for its own economic
advantage and not merely as a device for security enhancement.
Under an adhesion contract analysis the mortgagor should not be
bound by the clause because he is not required to read the contract
beyond its negotiated terms and would not reasonably have antici-
pated that the mortgage would contain such a clause.178 When a
lender includes in a mortgage contract a term that the borrower
might find surprising, the term should, at the least, be called to the
174. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 171, § 9-43.
175. See, e.g., Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 464, 276 N.E.2d 144, 147
(1971) (comparing adhesion contract to "'a package' in printed form" and placing burden
on drafter to show assent to "unusual or unconscionable terms").
176. For example, if all who entered into auto rental agreements read the full contract
before turning the ignition, much of the commercial world might grind almost to a halt. See
Kessler, supra note 170, at 632; Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Con-
tracts, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 833, 857 (1964).
177. See, e.g., Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 460-61, 276 N.E.2d 144, 145-
46 (1971).
178. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 171, § 9-46, at 346; K. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADrriON 370 (1960). In a recent case, a California Court of Appeal refused
to grant automatic enforcement to the beneficiary of a second trust deed under an adhesion
contract theory, but specifically found that the clause was ambiguous. See Wilhite v. Cal-
lihan, 121 Cal. App. 3d 661, -, 175 Cal. Rptr. 507, 512 (1981). Since the adhesion contract
analysis was one of several "constellated reasons," id. at -, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 512, that the
court gave for its result, whether the court would have viewed the inclusion of an express




borrower's attention. 179 Even if the term is, in some general sense,
"fair," the borrower should be given the opportunity to decide for
himself whether an otherwise unexpected term is acceptable to
him. When the objection to the term relates to its unexpected na-
ture, a lender may insulate himself by "flagging" or separately ne-
gotiating the term. If borrowers are made aware of the clause's ex-
istence they will have an incentive to negotiate the clause or to
shop for a mortgage that does not contain such a clause. Only if
borrowers shop for mortgages will mortgagees be motivated to offer
a mortgage without a due-on-sale clause.
2. Fairness
Courts ordinarily do not review mutually negotiated contracts
to determine their substantive fairness.1i s If fairness is understood
to relate to the bargain at the time of its inception, even courts of
equity traditionally have not upset bargains unless the imbalance
was extreme-a contract "such as no man in his senses and not
under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and
fair man would accept on the other."' 81 Particularly in recent
years, however, courts have subjected standardized form, adhesion
contracts to stricter scrutiny for substantive fairness. 182
Most of the authoritative discussion of the ability of courts to
review adhesion contracts for inherent fairness has been stated in
terms of "substantive unconscionability."1 83 Authorities have rec-
179. The objection might be stated that if courts required the borrower to be com-
pletely informed of the terms of the mortgage, lenders might not be able to enforce the
detailed provisions of foreclosure procedures since they were not "anticipated" by the bor-
rower. Borrowers, however, can be held to an expectation that a mortgage will contain nor-
mal and customary security protection provisions. In today's interest rate environment the
use of due-on-sale clauses to hedge interest rate risk may be normal and customary. In an
earlier and calmer interest rate environment, however, such use may not have been custom-
ary as is evidenced by the number of due-on-sale clause opinions which state that it was not.
Many mortgages executed during that period are still outstanding. See supra notes 155-59
and accompanying text.
180. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
("Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement without full knowledge of its terms might be held
to assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain") (footnote omitted).
181. Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750).
182. See 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 49, § 559A (Supp. 1980) and authorities cited
therein; Dugan, supra note 88. But see Mills v. Nashua Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 433 A.2d
1312, 1315 (N.H. 1981) (approving concept of adhesion contract, but stating that "courts
cannot.. . rewrite contacts merely because they might operate harshly or inequitably" and
noting absence of evidence that contracts did not result from "a mutual meeting of the
minds").
183. See Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 762-63, 773-
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ognized that the reasons for not enforcing a contract relate either
to the process of its formation or to its substantive content.""
With respect to the due-on-sale clause the issue may be framed as
follows: If a lender "flags" the clause, for example, by requiring a
special initialing, and the clause is clearly brought to the bor-
rower's attention, might a court still appropriately strike the clause
as an unfair term in an adhesion contract? Put differently, when
the deficiencies of notice related to adhesion contracts, as distin-
guished from mutually negotiated contracts, are eliminated, do dis-
tinctions remain that should invoke stricter scrutiny?
Some courts would answer these questions in the negative.
These courts view the giving of notice as, in effect, transmuting an
"adhesion term" into a "dickered term." Thus, they return to the
laissez-faire standard of review applied to traditional contracts.185
Other courts and writers, however, accept the proposition that
when all who offer a given commodity have incorporated the same
term in their contracts and will not negotiate it, or when the pur-
chaser justifiably assumes that shopping for relief from an onerous
term will only result in the substitution of equally onerous terms,
no genuine assent to the term is possible, and the bargain's fair-
ness remains reviewable.
186
A court reviewing a due-on-sale clause for substantive fairness
is in much the same position as a court deciding the reasonable-
ness of a restraint on alienation, and the result will depend upon
the court's concept of fairness. One judicial approach would be to
engage in a weighing of the aggregate benefits accruing to the
mortgagee and mortgagor. One court engaging in a restraint on
alienation analysis of a due-on-sale clause concluded that such bar-
gains are indeed fair exchanges-lenders are able to keep their
mortgage portfolios in a profitable state and a corresponding bene-
fit is received by borrowers in the form of more advantageous loan
terms. 87 This court's approach is consistent with the doctrine that
the contract must be inspected for unfairness or unconscionability
at its inception-if it was fair at that time, then the borrower may
not complain when he must fulfill his side of the bargain.
803 (1969); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 485, 509-28 (1967).
184. See Ellinghaus, supra note 183, at 773-803; Leff, supra note 183, at 509-28.
185. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
186. See J. MURRAY, supra note 171, § 353, at 748.




Such a finding, h6wever, cannot be the end of an adhesion
contract analysis. If fairness at inception were all that were re-
quired for a finding of overall fairness, virtually any contract provi-
sion could be justified on the theory that in a competitive environ-
ment the economic benefits of the clause's inclusion are passed on
to the adherent in the form of a reduction in cost. Yet, allocation
of detriment and benefit, even though fair in the aggregate, may be
unfair in the particular. When an adhesion contract allocates risk
to the class of adherents in such a way that the economic detri-
ment falls on a sufficiently small proportion of that class, the result
may be harsh in the individual instance and therefore unfair. The
unfairness does not arise in the allocation of risk or detriment be-
tween the stronger party and the class of adherents, but in the way
in which circumstances allocate the burden of the detriment
among the adherents. 18
Whether the burden imposed on an individual mortgagor by
the enforcement of a due-on-sale clause amounts to harshness is
certainly open to debate. Courts have repeatedly noted that the
acceleration of a mortgage loan in an environment of rising interest
rates imposes no loss on the mortgagor, but merely deprives him of
a profit that he had no particular reason to anticipate. 8" Neverthe-
less, even though the exercise of the due-on-sale clause merely al-
lows recoupment by the lender of the borrower's windfall, this
Note has demonstrated that the typical borrower who is forced to
prepay a sub-market rate mortgage is in a worse position than if
interest rates had remained unchanged from their level at the time
of the mortgage's inception.190 If he desires to reinvest and if he
188. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 403-04, 161 A.2d 69, 81
(1960). When the burdens of a contract are excessively harsh in particular cases, elements
are present that might justify unenforceability as a matter of public policy. The implication
is that public policy may be different in an adhesion contract setting than in a "dickered
contract" setting. In Henningsen the court found that the statutory authorization of agree-
ments between buyer and seller disclaiming warranties
did not authorize the automobile manufacturer to use its grossly disproprotionate bar-
gaining power to relieve itself from liability and to impose on the ordinary buyer, who
in effect has no real freedom of choice, the grave danger of injury to himself and others
that attends the sale of such a dangerous instrumentality as a defectively made
automobile.
Id. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95.
189. See, e.g., Dunham v. Ware Sav. Bank, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1607, _, 423 N.E.2d
998, 1002; Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 627, 224 S.E.2d 580, 585
(1976); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tenn. 1973) ("Finally analyzed, the situa-
tion here is simply that appellants can sell their property at a higher price if they can sell it
at the lower interest rate.").
190. That is, he cannot sell his property and then purchase similar property without
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must obtain financing, then he will be forced to borrow at the new
higher rate. Furthermore, the high interest rate will exacerbate his
financial disadvantage since the price he will receive for the prop-
erty will undoubtedly be less than it would have been in a lower
interest rate environment. Still, unless one imagines a market in
which credit is simply unavailable, and perhaps even in such a
market, the borrower's property will sell at some price, and the
means will probably be available to provide for the mortgage's pay-
ment. Whether this amounts to harshness is of course subjective;
the majority of the courts have concluded that it does not.
V. DUE-ON-ENCUMBRANCE CLAUSES
A term that has frequently appeared alongside a due-on-sale
clause in a mortgage is the due-on-encumbrance clause. This clause
contains the mortgagor's promise not to further encumber the
property or provides that the mortgagee may accelerate the mort-
gage note upon such encumbrance. The single case to have ruled
on the validity of such a clause in isolation is La Sala v. American
Savings & Loan Association.191 In La Sala the California Supreme
Court held that the enforcement of a due-on-encumbrance clause
was an unlawful restraint on alienation whenever the borrower's
execution of a junior mortgage did not endanger the lender's secur-
ity.192 Even though other courts have not explored the validity of
these clauses, 193 conclusions drawn from the preceding analysis
suggest that even though a jurisdiction may opt for the general en-
forcement of the due-on-sale clause, the same result is not necessa-
rily compelled in a due-on-encumbrance clause ruling.
A. Due-on-Encumbrance Clause as Restraint on Alienation
The court in La Sala assumed without discussion that a clause
stipulating acceleration of the mortgage upon encumbrance was a
sufficient interference with a property right to bring it within the
incurring financial loss. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
191. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
192. Id. at 869, 489 P.2d at 1115, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 851. The same reasoning was later
extended to the due-on-sale clause in Tucker v. Cassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629,
526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974), and Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943,
582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
193. This absence of case law may in part be the result of a reluctance on the part of
lenders to demand enforcement of due-on-encumbrance clauses. In La Sala the lender at-
tempted to have the borrowers' class action suit for declaratory judgment dismissed by




California statutory provision against restraints on alienation.""
Under the historic concept of the mortgage as a conveyance of le-
gal title subject to a condition subsequent, the mortgage was cer-
tainly "alienation" within the scope of the rule against re-
straints.195 Under the modern "lien theory" of the mortgage, 198 the
giving of property as security for a loan arguably is not "aliena-
tion" at all and, thus, not subject to the rule against restraints. In
the courts, the determination of whether the mortgaging of land
constitutes "alienation" has varied with the interest affected.
Courts have held that the execution of a mortgage is not "aliena-
tion" in the context of a provision in an insurance policy that de-
clared the policy void upon alienation of the property,'197 or a pro-
vision in a homestead act prohibiting alienation by an entryman
before the issuance of a patent. 98 On the other hand, a court has
held that a statute, which proscribed "alienation" of land held by a
widow during a subsequent remarriage, prevented her from mort-
gaging the property. 99 The proper position is that restraints on
encumbrance should be considered restraints on alienation if the
asserted restraint produces effects that the rules against restraints
on alienation are designed to prevent. The inability of an owner to
mortgage his land may run afoul of the social interests in promot-
ing the effective utilization of wealth, in keeping property respon-
sive to the current exigencies of its owners, and in encouraging the
improvement of property-all of which are interests protected by
the rule against restraints. 00
To the extent that a covenant or impediment against the
mortgaging of property removes potential loan collateral from the
marketplace, it is an impediment to the lending process itself.
194. See id. at 877-78, 489 P.2d 1121-22, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 857-58.
195. The intermediate appeals court in La Sala viewed the encumbrance of the prop-
erty as a reduction of the owner's interest, and in that sense an action on which a lender
might condition his continued extension of credit. La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n,
91 Cal. Rptr. 238, 242-43 (Cal. App. 1970), rev'd, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr.
849 (1971).
196. Under the lien theory the mortgagor holds legal title until there has been a fore-
closure. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHrrmAN, supra note 11, § 4.2, at 118.
197. See Smith v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 50 Me. 96, 97-98 (1863); see also Virginia Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Feagin Bros., 62 Ga. 515, 519 (1879) (mortgage not alienation within
meaning of state insurance statute).
198. See Stark v. Morgan, 73 Kan. 453, 85 P. 567 (1906); Worthington v. Tipton, 24
N.M. 89, 92-94, 172 P. 1048, 1049-50 (1918).
199. See United States Sav. Fund & Inv. Co. v. Harris, 142 Ind. 226, 237-38, 40 N.E.
1072, 1075 (1895).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 125-26.
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Credit arrangements may be the primary facilitant to capital for-
mation in a capitalist economy. When a mortgagor is prevented
from further borrowing against his property interest, this form of
capital flow is clogged. The result is a welfare loss to society.
Whether society will realize a net gain if the due-on-encum-
brance clause is declared an illegal restraint on alienation will de-
pend on whether the sum of the individual benefits resulting from
its inclusion in mortgage contracts are outweighed by the social
benefit resulting from the elimination of its effects in restraining
"alienation." As in the case of the due-on-sale clause, the mutual
benefit accruing to mortgagee and mortgagor are probably impossi-
ble to measure accurately. 0 1 An intuitive analysis, however, leads
to the conclusion that the due-on-encumbrance clause is probably
of minimal importance to lenders as an inducement to the exten-
sion of the long-term fixed rate mortgage.202 As a device to reduce
interest rate risk, the due-on-encumbrance clause is almost cer-
tainly less effective than the due-on-sale clause. The circumstances
that induce an owner to sell outright are frequently so compelling
that even a major sacrifice imposed by the prepayment of a sub-
market rate mortgage must be endured and lenders, therefore, can
predict property turnover with some degree of reliability for a
given area. The decision whether or not to enter into a junior
mortgage is probably more within the mortgagor's control-funds
may be borrowed under other arrangements, or he may simply opt
not to borrow at all.2 °3 Whether any rate risk premium that a
mortgagee must charge to extend a fixed rate mortgage is signifi-
cantly reduced in exchange for the borrower's willingness to enter
into a due-on-encumbrance agreement is doubtful. Certainly the
continued availability of the long-term fixed rate mortgage to con-
201. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
202. Whether due-on-encumbrance clauses still exist in a majority of the mortgage
instruments currently in use may be questioned. Current Federal Home Loan Bank Board
regulations prohibit the associations that it governs from enforcing due-on-encumbrance
clauses with respect to consumer mortgage loans made after July 31, 1976. 12 C.F.R. §§
545.8-3(f), (g)(1) (1981). These regulations also declare that associations continue to have
the power to include due-on-sale clauses in their mortgage contracts and that "the exercise
of [due-on-sale clauses] shall be exclusively governed by the terms of the loan contract, and
all rights and remedies of the association and the borrower shall be fixed and governed by
that contract." Id. § 545.8-3(f). Substantial litigation has ensued addressing the question
whether these regulations preempt state law. See Dunn & Nowinski, supra note 3, at 292-
300 and authorities cited therein.
203. Commentators have also noted that a property owner may more easily hide the
second mortgage transaction from a first mortgagee than hide an outright sale. See G. Os-
BORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 11, § 5.21, at 297.
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sumer homeowners will not hinge on the continued legality of the
due-on-encumbrance device.
Particular instances may still exist in which significant bene-
fits will accrue to a lender from the inclusion of a due-on-encum-
brance clause in a mortgage. A court in a majority rule jurisdic-
tion204 must decide whether such benefits are important enough to
warrant their inclusion in a class of "mortgagee's restraints" that
will be allowed. In a minority rule jurisdiction 20 5 a court, upon
proof of reasonableness by a lender, might allow the enforcement
of the clause on a case-by-case basis. In the vast majority of cases,
however, a general inclusion of the due-on-encumbrance clause
within the class of illegal restraints upon alienation would result in
a net benefit to society in terms of increased efficiency of resource
allocation.20 8
B. Analysis of the Due-on-Encumbrance Clause and the
Principles of Contract Law
A court may refuse to enforce a due-on-encumbrance clause as
a matter of contract law. The analysis is similar to the contract law
analysis of the due-on-sale clause-if under the circumstances the
clause was not a part of the parties' bargain, or if enforcement
would be an unfair use of a standardized form, enforcement should
be refused.207 Based on principles of contract interpretation, a re-
fusal to enforce a due-on-encumbrance clause included as a device
to exact increased rates of interest may be more difficult to justify
than a similar refusal to enforce a due-on-sale clause. The case for
invalidation of the due-on-encumbrance clause as an unconsciona-
ble adhesion contract, however, may be stronger than the case for a
finding that the due-on-sale clause should be invalidated on this
ground. 08
1. Interpretation of the Due-on-Encumbrance Clause
The interpretation of the due-on-encumbrance term follows
the same lines of analysis as the interpretation of the due-on-sale
term. This Note has demonstrated that the potential double pur-
pose of the due-on-sale clause may render the clause ambiguous.20 9
204. See supra text accompanying notes 105-10.
205. See id.
206. See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 149-90 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 170-90 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
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This argument may have less force in the case of the due-on-en-
cumbrance clause since the usefulness of the clause as a device to
enhance the quality of the mortgagee's security is so speculative.210
Nonetheless, if a court finds that at the time the contract was exe-
cuted lenders customarily did not exact a penalty or interest rate
increase in return for allowing a mortgagor to further encumber his
land, the rule of interpretation of the contract most strongly
against the drafter should prevail and the lender should be allowed
to enforce only for the purpose of protecting his security.
2. Due-on-Encumbrance Clause as Contract of Adhesion
Adhesion contracts are subject to judicial review if their terms
are unfair or if they result in surprise.2 11 The argument that the
due-on-encumbrance clause is substantively unfair is not as strong
as the argument that the due-on-sale clause is unfair, since the
mortgagor, in most circumstances, has more personal discretion to
avoid giving a junior lien than he does to avoid the outright sale of
property. The argument that due-on-encumbrance clauses are
"surprising" to the borrower is much more persuasive because of
the minimal impact of the clause as protection of the lender's se-
curity. The average consumer mortgagor is probably as surprised
to find that he cannot further encumber without paying off the
first mortgage, as he would be to find that the loan might be accel-
erated if he lost his job. Presumably either of these terms might be
enforced if the parties knowingly bargained for and agreed to it.
Neither term should be enforced when included without warning
in a lengthy contract, the bulk of whose terms would be incompre-
hensible to the average consumer. Because a due-on-encumbrance
clause is substantially more "surprising" than a due-on-sale clause,
it should be correspondingly more vulnerable to invalidation under
the law of standardized contracts.
210. Although some commentators imply that the due-on-encumbrance clause en-
hances the lender's security by limiting the borrower's access to junior financing, see G.
OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 11, at 297; Volkmer, supra note 11, at 770,
an honest appraisal of the mortgagee's position suggests that, at least with respect to com-
pleted residential properties, the lender's primary purpose in including the clause is the
reduction of interest rate risk. The lender in La Sala candidly admitted that a purpose in
including the clause was to insert a trigger, in addition to sale, that would allow acceleration
of the note with the subsequent opportunity for the lender to maintain a more profitable
mortgage portfolio. La Sala v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 889 n.17, 489 P.2d
1113, 1123 n.17, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 859 n.17 (1971).




Due-on-sale clauses and due-on-encumbrance clauses are re-
straints on alienation, and their enforcement imposes costs upon
society. As devices to shift interest rate risk from the mortgage
lender to the borrower, their effectiveness is questionable, and, in
an environment in which long-term mortgage rates have become
increasingly unpredictable, whether the preservation of the devices
will contribute meaningfully to the preservation of the thirty-year
fixed rate mortgage is doubtful. A court which believes that the
announcement of a rule of general unenforceability would unjustly
injure the vested rights of lenders should invalidate the clauses
through a rule of prospective application, rather than institutional-
ize a device whose social effects are harmful and whose purpose
can be achieved by more benign means.
A jurisdiction which determines that automatically enforcea-
ble due-on-sale and due-on-encumbrance clauses are socially desir-
able should place the burden on lenders to ensure that any unfair-
ness resulting from their enforcement is minimized. Its courts
should insist that if either clause is to be enforced, the clause must
clearly be brought to the attention of the borrower by means of an
unambiguous statement of the lender's purpose. Lenders should
not be permitted to use standardized contracts and routine judicial
enforcement to relieve themselves of risks that they were able to
foresee but of which many or most of their customers were una-
ware at the time their mortgages were executed.
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